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CHANGE DETECTION OF EMOTIONAL INFORMATION ACROSS THE ADULT
LIFESPAN
MARIA J. DONALDSON-MISENER
ABSTRACT
Visual change detection ability is necessary for successful interaction with the
environment, yet few studies have been conducted on change detection with older adults,
and whether their use of top-down and bottom-up processing differs from younger adults,
especially with emotional processing. Emotions can be motivating and guide the scope of
attention using top-down processing and can capture attention in an automatic, bottom-up
fashion. Theories of socioemotional aging suggest that younger and older adults may be
differentially motivated to process positive and/or negative aspects of the environment,
and these tendencies may have implications for age-related trajectories in well-being.
Change detection efficacy in older adulthood may be influenced by whether individuals
process salient and motivationally relevant emotional stimuli. To address the impact of
age and emotional information processing on change detection performance, two
experiments were conducted. Experiment 1 addressed whether individuals differ in their
detection of neutral and emotional object changes and whether such differences are
influenced by age. Participants were instructed to detect the appearance or disappearance
of positive, negative, and neutral objects to understand how these factors impact change
detection ability. Positive preferences were noted for both age groups, with enhanced
processing for positive onsets and negative offsets. The focus of Experiment 2 was to
investigate the influence of four top-down motivations, prioritizing each visual change
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and valence on change detection by creating contexts in which the target may be initially
non-emotional, but the target acquires emotional meaning based on the situation. The
strength of Experiment 2 was to assess the role of explicit top-down motivations on how
emotional goals and contextual features may impact change detection for younger and
older adults, which could not be assessed in Experiment 1. Overall, negativity effects
emerged in Experiment 2, wherein both younger and older adults prioritized processing
of negative onsets in the threat condition, contrary to Experiment 1. The present research
revealed many age similarities in change detection ability. Participants’ attention was
commanded more heavily toward positive targets in the absence of a specific motivation,
but when provided with explicit top-down motivation, participants’ attention was most
sensitive for detection of threat.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The human attentional system constantly processes a remarkable amount of
information. We live in a dynamic world, and there are multiple demands on our attention
at any given time (Malcolm & Shomstein, 2015). Attentional capacity is finite. We
simply cannot constantly attend to every aspect of our visual field, and any attempts to do
so would be overwhelming. Thus, human cognition is adept at prioritizing salient visual
events. Maintenance of attentional prioritization and related abilities are critical across
the lifespan, and there is active debate surrounding preservation of attentional faculties
across adulthood and old age (Costello, Madden, Shepler, Mitroff, & Leber, 2010;
Knight, Seymour, Gaunt, Baker, Nesmith, & Mather, 2007). Attention is a multi-faceted
process; some facets of which tend to decline as we age and others that remain intact
across older adulthood. Specifically, Costello and colleagues (2010) maintain that there is
evidence of top-down attentional control being preserved across the adult lifespan. In this
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regard, when an older adult has a particular goal in mind, he or she is able to accomplish
this goal by maintaining attentional focus on facets of the environment congruent with his
or her intentions. Conversely, older adults may have difficulty inhibiting distraction, so
even if their top-down attentional resources are actively seeking out goal-relevant
information in the environment, they may have difficulty tuning out extraneous visual
information (Rodrigues & Pandeirada, 2015).
Intact attentional abilities are critical to many facets of life, including driving,
independent living, and detection of threat and danger. Findings from studies assessing a
variety of attentional domains indicate age-related declines in processing speed
(Salthouse, 1996), reduced useful field of view (UFOV; Wood & Owsley, 2014), and
decreased spatial location ability (Scialfa & Kline, 1988). Because all of these processes
affect attentional faculties, which enable us to successfully navigate our environments
and make sense of the world, it is logical to examine how these processes interact as we
age.
Mechanisms Underlying Attention
Individuals use both top-down and bottom-up processing resources to
successfully engage with the environment on a daily basis. When top-down processing is
used, prior knowledge, experience, and motivations guide our perceptions, in a
potentially goal-oriented manner. Bottom-up processing is data-driven and occurs when a
stimulus, or features of a stimulus, in the environment command attention, often very
quickly (Nothdurft, 2000). According to Nothdurft, attentional capture via bottom-up or
exogenous means generally occurs because the object or event ultimately commanding
attention is distinct from the surrounding environment through size, color, luminance, or
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other salient features. Top-down control enables people to overtly seek out particular
information in the visual world, depending on observers’ behavioral goals and/or prior
knowledge (Walther & Koch, 2007). For example, a building surveyor assessing a
skyscraper on a busy street is able to attend only to the visual information that is
necessary to complete his or her job (i.e., appearance of windows, the foundation, and
upper levels). S/he can successfully inhibit the noise of street traffic, vendors, or birds
flying. Exogenous and endogenous attentional systems function in concert with one
another. That is, if someone shouted for help, or a bus were driving toward him/her,
bottom-up processing resources would likely be activated. When bottom-up driven
attentional activation occurs, s/he has effectively “paused” his/her survey, and s/he can
quickly react to a call for help or avoid the bus. In this sense, when we use top-down
processing resources, we can volitionally interact with aspects of the environment that fit
with our current behavioral goals and deprioritize other aspects that are not goal-relevant.
However, since bottom-up processing often operates in the background, we can rapidly
use these resources to react to events in need of our immediate attention.
From an evolutionary point of view, the interplay between top-down control and
bottom-up informational processing is advantageous. Both top-down and bottom-up
processing resources are used in typical attentional processing tasks, such as a visual
search task. Although bottom-up processing mechanisms are particularly useful when
targets are distinct from background noise and distractors, or when targets represent a
distinct visual event (i.e., onset of a new object), these types of situations rarely occur in
natural environments. Moreover, most natural environments are imbued with emotional
content. Much prior work assessing the role of exogenous and endogenous attentional
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control has been conducted using neutral stimuli, with less of a focus on emotionally
evocative information.
Typically, visual search and attentional tasks involve attentional capture via the
“pop out” or onset of an object through exogenous or bottom-up processing means.
Attentional capture by other types of visual events, such as offsets, or the disappearance
of previously viewed stimuli, likely occur through endogenous or top-down processing
means, as this form of capture is typically construed as being more dependent on prior
knowledge and goal-relevant motives (Walther & Koch, 2007). However, when
emotional information is introduced, as in the present experiments, valence affects both
endogenous and exogenous attentional streams. Negative, and especially threatening,
events that appear in a visual array are likely to be efficiently and prioritized due to
bottom-up/exogenous salience (Mather & Sutherland, 2011). Attentional capture by
negative or threatening stimuli is detected in early visual areas (Theeuwes, 2004), and is
processed quickly through the ventral component of the frontoparietal network, in a
stimulus-driven, or exogenous, manner. This form of attentional capture temporarily
dampens attention guided by behavioral goals and motivations so that we can efficiently
process and react to negative and salient events for survival. Furthermore, attentional
guidance toward positive events can be motivated by top-down or endogenous means,
especially when these are relevant to observers’ behavioral goals (Mather & Sutherland).
Attentional guidance toward positive events is especially relevant for older adults who
have a more limited future time perspective, and so are cognitively motivated to seek out
positive information (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999). Because positively
valenced stimuli typically does not entail a threat component, it is processed in the dorsal
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component of the frontoparietal network (Cabeza, 2002) and other higher order cortical
areas later in the processing stream (Connor, Egeth, & Yantis, 2004) because guiding
attention toward self-relevant goals may be an ongoing process, not one that must occur
instantaneously. Thus, in order to fully appreciate the role of emotion on attentional
capture, emotion must be examined within an interplay of endogenous and exogenous
processing streams, as both forms of attentional processing of emotional information are
likely to be encountered regularly in naturalistic settings within our environment.
Some evidence suggests that bottom-up processing may be impaired in older
adulthood, and perceptual changes may be more difficult to detect in a bottom-up
manner, especially if visual changes are neutral or irrelevant to one’s behavioral goals
(Porter, Wright, Tales, & Gilchrist, 2012). However, considerable evidence supports the
preservation of top-down processing abilities as we age (Madden, Whiting, Spaniol, &
Bucur, 2005), such that older adults are capable of volitionally engaging with certain
aspects of the environment. This ability promotes inhibition of distracting and irrelevant
stimuli, which contributes to more efficient search strategies and attentional control
(Peterson & Kramer, 2001). In addition, more recent evidence suggests that older adults
are as capable as younger adults at inhibiting distracting stimuli when informative cues
are present; however, attentional capture of irrelevant information is more likely for older
adults compared to younger adults when informative cues are unavailable (Whiting,
Madden, & Babcock, 2007). Although top-down attentional control is largely preserved,
there are some age-related declines in maintenance of attentional guidance that can affect
the efficiency and success of visual search (e.g., Colcombe et al., 2003). Notably, agerelated reductions in working memory capacity may contribute to difficulties with
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cognitive control during visual search tasks (Redick & Engle, 2011), and older adults
may experience particular difficulty with inhibiting distracting information (Hsieh, Wu,
& Tang, 2016), which may prolong the time it takes to detect targets during a visual
search.
Through the interaction of both forms of processing, individuals are able to
volitionally interact with the environment because bottom-up processing resources, which
often run in the background, can override top-down processing control if stimuli that are
in need of immediate attention (i.e., something threatening) emerge (Yantis, 2005). A
frontoparietal network is implicated during visual search and other attentional tasks
(Kastner, 2004). The dorsal component of this network promotes attentional guidance via
top-down processing (Cabeza, 2002). Because of age-related increases in frontal lobe
activity during cognitive processing, older adults may rely more heavily on top-down
processing resources compared to younger adults (Cabeza, 2002). Conversely,
information that could signal threat and danger rapidly attracts attention and is guided by
bottom-up processing faculties through the ventral component of the frontoparietal
network (Madden, 2007). Here, attentional resources are quickly deployed away from
one’s behavioral goals and toward these salient events when informed by stimulus-driven
processes in our perceptual systems (Theeuwes, 2004). Thus, it is logical that attentional
capture through stimulus-driven means occurs rapidly, as early visual areas process this
information (Theeuwes, 2004). Conversely, top-down attentional control requires the
activation of higher order cortical processing and occurs later in the processing stream
(Connor, Egeth, & Yantis, 2004). Theeuwes (2004) maintains that top-down attentional
control will always be overridden by bottom-up processing if a threat arises, or some
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other visual event in the environment requires immediate attention. Additionally, topdown attentional control is likely to dominate when demands for bottom-up processing
are low (Rolls, 2008). Thus, when observers do not need to be vigilant to potential
threats, attention is more likely to be guided by top-down motivational cues. However,
once the situation changes such that vigilance and quick responses to visual events are
again relevant, the attentional system can minimize the top-down system and prioritize
attentional capture through bottom-up processing means. Current research supports an
ongoing interplay between top-down and bottom-up processing for both younger and
older adults. This relationship can be modulated depending on the demands of the
situation and the goals of the individual, so as to ensure successful interactions with the
environment (Yantis, 2005).
Attentional Prioritization
Generally, the human attentional system is adept at directing attention to further
process salient information within our environment. Given the complex nature of our
visual environment, it is expected that not all visual events will be processed with
equitable efficiency. The specific aspects of the visual world that command attention
differ across environments and age groups, and even within individuals, as motivations
and abilities vary. In this manner, we are remarkably capable of using attentional
resources efficiently. However, sometimes, as will be covered thoroughly later, salient
visual events fail to attract attention adaptively (Simons & Rensink, 2005). Because of
these occurrences, it is necessary to better understand the circumstances surrounding
instances when our attentional systems fail to prioritize important visual events and how
to minimize the frequency of these instances (Malcolm & Shomstein, 2015).
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Scene processing. Considerations of how organisms visually process a scene or
environment reveal that not all features receive equal attention. For instance, when an
observer initially approaches a room, if each table or floor tile received as much
consideration as more relevant and informative stimuli (e.g., peoples’ faces, a dangerous
object/weapon), scene processing would be highly inefficient, navigation within this
environment would be impaired, and our survival could be compromised. By efficiently
prioritizing visual events in the environment, humans (and several non-human species)
automatically allocate attentional resources toward other individuals, and potential threats
are attended to prior to engaging with more mundane visual features (e.g., Parasuraman
& Galster, 2013).
Visual search. As mentioned earlier, an area of visual attentional research
relevant to a discussion of attentional prioritization is visual search. Visual search
paradigms that focus on attentional capture are helpful in order to evaluate how the
prioritization of visual events unfolds. In a typical visual search study, participants are
instructed to look for a pre-specified target stimulus among other distractor symbols,
shapes, or letters within a visual array. Generally, the array is continuously presented
until the target is located; thus, this task assesses attentional functioning without strong
demands on memory ability (Yantis & Jonides, 1984). Here, the type of target stimulus
and distractors are task-dependent, but target characteristics can also influence how
effectively the target is located.
As we age, declines in sensory abilities, executive function, and selective
attention can impact visual search ability, particularly for more challenging visual
searches (i.e., larger search arrays, less distinction between targets and distractors), which
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can result from age-related reductions in brain volume in dorsal frontoparietal regions
(Müller-Oehring, Schulte, Rohlfing, Pfefferbaum, & Sullivan, 2013). However, there is
evidence for maintained selective attention ability in cases of top-down control (Costello,
Madden, Shepler, Mitroff, & Leber, 2010). In other words, older adults can maintain
attention or direct attention toward visual events, consistent with their behavioral goals,
and away from distractors using top-down processing mechanisms. To illustrate, if an
older individual is watching a movie with some sad elements, but their behavioral goal is
to maintain a positive mood, he or she may selectively attend to the non-negative aspects
of the movie and ignore scenes or elements that are sad and thereby undermine the
experience of any pleasant feelings. Relatedly, there is research suggesting that within
certain memory and attention tasks, presenting information that is either in line with older
adults’ motivational goals or is imbued with personal relevance (e.g., themes such as
grandparenthood and retirement), performance is more successful (Mather & Carstensen,
2005). Thus, perhaps observations of age-related deficits in visual search could at least be
partially mitigated by providing older adults with motivationally-relevant stimuli.
Change detection and blindness. Change detection is another domain of
attention wherein prioritization of changing visual events over static ones becomes
critical. Next time a basketball game is on, watch how often the players move up and
down the court, change orientations, and adjust the movements and positions of their
bodies. In most complex environments, many items will change moment to moment: cars
will travel along a road, traffic signals change, animals move about. Other objects, such
as sidewalks and buildings, remain static. However, with limited attentional resources
available, people typically do not focus on unchanging features of the environment.
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Rather, it is important to dedicate attentional resources to the objects that change, as these
objects may be very informative and may necessitate an adaptive response (i.e., for
personal safety/survival).
In some cases, despite attempting to maintain vigilance to our surroundings,
people fail to notice large visual changes in their environment, a phenomenon referred to
as change blindness (Simons & Rensink, 2005). Although it is ideal to respond to visual
changes as quickly as possible, particularly if such changes represent a potential threat, in
some cases, the visual event goes unnoticed. Change blindness may occur more
frequently if the environment is particularly complex, there are too many facets of the
environment to attend to adequately, or if people are experiencing stress or trying to
manage too many internal tasks (Simons & Rensink, 2005).
Change blindness was first demonstrated in the laboratory by using an
experimental technique known as the flicker paradigm, which is intended to simulate
what happens during an eye movement (i.e., saccade; Rensink, O’Regan, & Clark, 1997).
In this paradigm, two images that are identical to one another, except that one of the
objects in the image changes to another object (e.g., a stapler in one image is replaced by
a ruler in the other image), “flicker” over one another in an alternating pattern until the
change is located. Rensink et al. observed that an unexpectedly long duration (5 seconds
on average if the change is in a central interest location, and 10 seconds on average if the
change is in a marginal interest location) was required for successful detection of the
difference between the images. In other words, basic change detection may not be
particularly efficient. This occurrence has been demonstrated both within (Bubic, 2008)
and outside a laboratory environment (Simons & Levin, 2004).
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Simons and Rensink (2005) posit that although change blindness is a common
occurrence, it does not happen randomly. Susceptibility to change blindness may differ
for different kinds of visual events, for people of different ages, and for different qualities
of a visual scene (e.g., perceptual salience and/or motivational importance). Change
blindness can occur in normal everyday situations. For example, movie viewers may miss
the presence of bloopers and other mistakes editors may have overlooked. Additionally, a
distracted driver may fail to notice another vehicle on a road. As illustrated by these
examples, although it may appear that we are vigilant to our surroundings, attend to
details in the environment, and notice the people around us, attention is not an unlimited
resource (Simons & Rensink, 2005). Aspects of typical activities in our daily lives may
not capture attention, but more critically, people fail to notice visual changes in complex
high-risk environments (Levin & Varakin, 2004). Failure to notice such visual changes
can lead to grave consequences.
Noticing when changes occur in the environment can be challenging and taxing.
In our daily lives, we encounter situations where it is necessary to recognize the
replacement of objects (e.g., one customer from another at a food service counter), object
onsets (e.g., another vehicle merging ahead on a highway), and object offsets (e.g.,
missing merchandise in a retail store). The priority given to each of these visual events is
largely a product of the salience and urgency that the events represent, as well as the
context in which they are situated (e.g., missing child versus missing merchandise).
Maintaining successful change detection ability is advantageous in all domains, but since
attention is a finite resource, attending to everything in the environment is overwhelming
and untenable.
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The particular psychological mechanisms influencing whether or not visual
changes are successfully detected have been the subject of active debate in the selective
attention literature; researchers generally agree that change blindness occurs in
conjunction with the deployment of observers’ attention (Bubic, 2008). Overall, the
human attentional system is able to detect and react to salient stimuli with remarkable
speed and efficiency. As mentioned earlier, since attentional capacity is finite, it is
maladaptive to allocate limited resources to objects or features that are stable and
unchanging. Instead, even when focusing or attending to something in the environment,
people allocate more attentional resources to novel or distinct components (Yantis, 2005).
This form of attentional deployment transpires regardless of observers’ goals, indicating
this process occurs as an extension of bottom-up processing (Beck & Kastner, 2005).
However, salient stimuli can also contain motivational value (e.g., emotional stimuli that
signal the presence of a threat or danger that should be avoided), or a sudden onset,
offset, or change in a stimulus may be informative to the viewer because he or she may
have to respond to the stimulus in some way (e.g., move lanes to avoid a merging
vehicle). As such, change detection of salient stimuli can occur without voluntary intent,
so attentional deployment can be beneficial to our survival (Rauschenberger, 2003).
Change detection and aging. Early work on change detection ability in older
adults has not yet fully explained how mechanisms underlying attentional processing
operate later in life. Preliminary evidence supports the preservation of some bottom-up
and top-down processing resources (Madden, Whiting, Spaniol, & Bucur, 2005; Costello,
Madden, Shepler, Mitroff, & Leber, 2010), but whether and how these mechanisms alter

12

change detection ability as people age is not fully understood, given that change detection
relies on a successful interaction of bottom-up and top-down components.
Within a standard change detection paradigm, both bottom-up and top-down
processing resources can be utilized depending on the nature of the change. As outlined
in more detail below, the detection of a new object entering one’s field of view is
assumed to engage bottom-up processing resources (i.e., due to the novelty and
perceptual salience of an object onset). Conversely, the detection of objects being
removed from a scene may rely more heavily on top-down processing resources since the
observer must use their memory of the preceding scene/environment to accurately detect
the change. Research on change detection from a developmental framework is crucial to
informing the debate about attentional preservation across the lifespan, particularly
because intact visual change detection abilities promote successful interaction with our
environment. In general, little is known regarding particular changes (declines,
improvement, maintenance) in change detection ability across the adult lifespan. Previous
work on change detection ability in older adults has yielded somewhat mixed findings,
further complicated by the use of different types of tasks, stimuli, and conceptualizations
of change paradigms.
In one previous study, Costello and colleagues (2010) found that older adults
were less efficient at change detection and, thus, were more susceptible to change
blindness because older adults exhibited lower accuracy and required more cycles within
a flicker paradigm to locate a change. Declines in processing speed may have
compounded these deficits in visual attention, especially when the target is unknown
and/or a computer-generated abstract symbol, as is the case with standard change
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detection tasks (Costello, Madden, Mitroff, & Whiting, 2010). In another study, older
adults took more time to detect changes in driving-related photographs (Pringle, Irwin,
Kramer, & Atchley, 2001). Pringle et al. posited that an additional time consideration
(i.e., speed of search) for the specified target or change might compound the amount of
time older adults needed to locate the change (Humphrey & Kramer, 1977). However,
Veiel, Storandt, and Abrams (2006) pointed out that Pringle and colleagues failed to
control for known age-related declines in processing speed ability when using an older
adult sample.
Veiel, Storandt, and Abrams (2006) further addressed age-related differences in
change detection performance using eye-tracking to demonstrate predictive relationships
between near-real time visual attention metrics and change detection ability. Veiel and
colleagues observed that age differences in change detection ability could be explained
by age-related reductions in processing speed and a reduced useful field of view (UFOV).
Additionally, their data also indicated that older adults rechecked the location of the
change, perhaps due to stricter criteria for making detection decisions. For example, an
older individual may only indicate that he or she has found the change by returning to the
correct location to confirm the detection. A younger adult may be more comfortable with
some degree of uncertainty. Thus, older adults may exhibit slower reaction times than
younger adults because older adults report the change when they are sure, rather than
when they first detect it.
To fully appreciate age-related differences and context-dependent declines in
change detection ability, researchers must also consider related faculties known to
diminish with age. For example, spatial localization ability is known to decrease with
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age, a resource used in scene processing; thus, this perceptual component may also hinder
older adults’ change detection ability (Scialfa & Kline, 1988). Furthermore, Veiel and
colleagues (2006) found that older adults’ change detection ability, compared to younger
adults, was compromised above and beyond what would be predicted by processing
speed theories alone. Current findings in the literature point to greater change blindness
for older adults compared to younger adults (Costello, Madden, Mitroff, & Whiting,
2010; Veiel, Storandt, & Abrams, 2006), although this shift may represent a multifaceted
process attributable to difficulty with inhibition and general age-related declines in
attention.
Mechanisms underlying change detection performance: onset primacy.
Attentional mechanisms underlying age differences in change detection can differ as a
function of experience, motivation, behavioral goals, and the type of visual change that
occurs. Early studies on change detection and change blindness included instances of
unexpected object replacement, both in the laboratory (e.g., office supplies changing to
other office supplies; Levin & Varakin, 2004) and in more natural settings outside the lab
(e.g., the exchange of one conversation partner by another; Simons & Levin, 2004).
Change blindness research has more recently focused on other types of visual changes to
further understand the circumstances under which awareness is hampered. In one type of
task, participants are required to identify an abrupt change in the search display, wherein
the target stimulus is either the appearance of a new object (object onset) or the
disappearance of a previously viewed object (object offset). Results from studies using
these types of tasks have consistently revealed that onsets are detected with greater speed
and accuracy than object offsets (Yantis & Jonides, 1984). Yantis and Jonides described

15

this phenomenon as onset primacy. Brockmole and Henderson (2005) used eye-tracking
to investigate the role of transients, which are changes in visual properties that co-occur
with object onsets. These researchers found that participants could attend to a nontransient onset if the participants had an opportunity to develop some memory for a visual
scene prior to the onset. However, attentional capture in this manner is driven by topdown means, rather than attentional capture by onsets accompanied by visual transients,
which occur in a bottom-up fashion. In this sense, attentional mechanisms can adapt to
various types of onsets, but this form of attentional capture has a strong memorial
component (Brockmole & Henderson, 2005). In addition to transients, other changes in
visual properties, such as luminance, quantity, and color, are also produced during the
onset of a new object; however, evidence from the visual search literature indicates that
the object onset itself, rather than other concomitant visual changes, ultimately captures
an observer’s attention (Jonides & Yantis, 1988; but see also Hollingworth, Simons, &
Franconeri, 2010).
Because there are instances where we must identify missing objects or recognize
that something has been added to our field of view, more research has been dedicated to
onsets and offsets compared to other types of visual change events (e.g., Cole,
Liversedge, & Simon, 2006; Cole, Kentridge, & Heywood, 2004). Thus, support for
onset primacy has also been noted in change blindness paradigms. Cole et al. (2003) used
a one-shot flicker paradigm, in which two images are presented in succession, separated
by a gray screen, for only one cycle. Cole and colleagues found that observers were more
resistant to change blindness when experiencing object onsets than offsets, presumably
due to onset primacy. Using three-dimensional scenes with naturally occurring visual
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cues in a one-shot flicker paradigm, Donaldson and Yamamoto (2012) replicated Cole et
al.’s (2003) findings, providing further evidence that onset primacy exists in a change
blindness context. In sum, research indicates that the prioritization of relevant visual
events, and specifically onset primacy, is a robust occurrence applicable to many domains
of visual attention.
Change detection and attentional flexibility. It is likely that onset primacy
occurs for its evolutionary value. By attending to - and evaluating - the importance of
new objects entering into one’s environment, observer’s increase the likelihood of
reacting appropriately, which thereby promotes survival (Cole et al., 2003). Until an
onset succeeds in capturing attention, it is unknown to the observer if it is necessary to
react in a particular way. Thus, new objects are generally processed rapidly to optimize
survival. Yet, as Cole et al. and Donaldson and Yamamoto (2012) have demonstrated, it
is not the case that offsets are missed entirely. Successful detection of all types of visual
changes probably has some survival utility (Donaldson & Yamamoto, 2016); thus,
change detection ability should extend beyond the scope of onset primacy. Take
lifeguarding for example. Here, the processing advantage likely shifts from onset
detection to offset detection for purposes of loss prevention. For instance, a lifeguard
must be able to recognize when a swimmer has disappeared from view (i.e., has gone
underwater) and take appropriate action in that scenario. Thus, detection of offset events
is just as important (if not more so) as onset primacy in that context. Relatedly,
Donaldson and Yamamoto (2016) pitted two hypotheses, the default mode hypothesis
(i.e., bias for detecting onsets both more rapidly and more accurately) and the attention
modulation hypothesis (i.e., flexibility with detecting offsets more efficiently under
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situations where this is favorable), against one another to determine if onset primacy
persists in environments prioritizing offset detection. In other words, the default mode
refers to the tendency to be more vigilant to onset detection using bottom-up processing
resources, whereas attentional modulation allows for flexible detection of offsets when
task and motivational manipulations are provided that promote offset prioritization using
top-down processing resources. If support were found for the default mode hypothesis,
then onset primacy would still be observed in experimental conditions favoring offset
advantage. However, under the attention modulation hypothesis, although it may be the
case that the human attentional system is programmed toward onset primacy, as it may
indeed be advantageous in most situations, if a scenario arose favoring an offset
advantage, we should be able to flexibly adapt to offsets. Thus, we sought to answer
whether onset primacy is a hard and fast rule or whether it could be overridden if the
environment, and behavioral goals of the observer are congruent with an offset
advantage.
In this study, participants were randomly divided into one of four conditions. All
participants viewed a training block and a testing block. The testing block contained
equal amounts of onset and offset trials and was identical for all participants. The
difference between conditions was the structure of the training trials. One condition
provided no specific instruction for favoring onsets or offsets, and an equal number of
onset and offset trials were presented; another condition induced offset bias by having
participants receive a disproportionate percentage of offset relative to onset trials during
the training block (80% vs. 20%); another condition gave participants explicit
instructions to focus on offset trials, but there were an equal proportion of onset and
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offset trials; and finally, a condition had participants explicitly focus on offset trials and
provided a disproportionate number of offset to onset trials (80% to 20%). Participants
viewed image pairs that represented either an onset or an offset. Images were presented
using a one-shot flicker paradigm. Participants completed a left-right judgment task to
indicate the side of the screen on which the change occurred. Participants were able to
respond following the appearance of the second image, at which point, participants had
viewed both photographs and could judge which object had been removed or added.
Reaction time and accuracy were recorded when a button press occurred.
Results based on the training block data for younger adults revealed significantly
shorter reaction times to onset trials compared to offset trials when no offset instructions
were presented and there were an equal number of onset and offset trials. However,
significantly shorter reaction times were observed for offset trials compared to onset trials
in the condition where offset instructions were given and the trial where the majority of
trials were offsets. These results suggest that implicitly exposing participants to
additional offset trials without an instruction, or giving them equal amounts of onsets and
offset trials with an instruction to attend with greater priority to offsets, was sufficient for
reducing onset primacy. However, when these two manipulations were combined, offset
bias was actually promoted. These results carried over successfully into a testing block
but only when the number of training trials was doubled. Results from this study indicate
that attentional modulation to promote detection of offsets can occur when individuals are
provided sufficient motivation, but the strongest effect emerges when both bottom-up
(80% offset trials, 20% onset trials) and top-down (verbal instruction) processing cues are
provided.
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Attentional flexibility in aging. Age differences in the speed of change detection
may be expected when investigating attention across the adult life span; however,
reductions in the speed of detection are less interesting than understanding how the
mechanisms guiding change detection may unfold as we age. When the Donaldson and
Yamamoto (2016) attentional flexibility paradigm was applied to an older adult sample,
results revealed a significant interaction between trial type and condition on reaction
time, such that onset primacy was eliminated for participants who received both the
additional offset trials during a first block and an instruction to attend more during offset
trials. Additionally, a marginally significant interaction between trial type and condition
indicated higher accuracy on offset trials for participants provided with both
manipulations. These results offer additional evidence for attentional flexibility whereby
offset biases successfully emerge through the dynamic interplay of both bottom-up and
top-down processing mechanisms, suggesting that both components may be integral to
supporting older adults’ successful change detection performance.
There is additional evidence that both bottom-up and top-down manipulations
impact older adults’ performance on attentional tasks, which is beneficial for older adults
so that they can engage volitionally with a scene while remaining vigilant to salient
events (Connor, Egeth, & Yantis, 2004). Results from the younger adult sample in
Donaldson and Yamamoto (2016) suggest that the human visual system is particularly
tuned to the detection of object onsets; however, data from the older adult sample
provides evidence that the human attentional system can adaptively and flexibly adjust to
detect non-onset events. Since older adults likely have a longer history of exposure to
many different types of visual experiences, they may be more in tune with detection of

20

non-onset events than younger adults. Alternatively, onsets and offsets may represent two
fundamentally distinct forms of visual events. Without attending to an onset, it is
unknown whether it is benign or may pose a threat; since offsets are deletions of
previously viewed aspects of the environment, their occurrence may not command
attention with such immediacy as onsets. However, it is unclear if this discrepancy
between the noticeability of onsets and offsets will hold for all types of stimuli or objects.
Previous change detection paradigms have relied on basic objects, which are neutral in
nature, presented within situations where participants may not be overly motivated to
attend to these visual stimuli in a particular way. However, most scenarios that
necessitate adaptive change detection in our day-to-day lives likely have an emotional
quality, providing interesting test cases for age-related trajectories in change detection
abilities in more realistic contexts. Emotional information can be highly salient and
processed with high priority for individuals of all ages (Carstensen & Turk-Charles,
1994). Furthermore, many natural examples of onset (avoiding colliding with a merging
vehicle) and offset (a lifeguard needing to notice swimmers that go underwater) detection
represent situations that are imbued with emotional value.
Aging and Emotional Attention
In our daily lives, people encounter both positive and negative information, in
personal experiences of affect, as well as in facial expressions and images. Emotional
information can help guide our cognition and behavior in a variety of situations.
Emotionally valenced stimuli are often very noticeable, and humans have a natural
tendency to deploy attentional resources toward the processing of emotional information
in the environment (Carretié, 2014). Diverse emotionality is central to the human
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experience, and recognition of emotional valence informs how people should respond to
their environment and help shape current and future behavior.
The way in which people attend to - and process - emotional information may
change as a function of age. Sociemotional Selectivity Theory (Carstensen, Isaacaowitz,
& Charles, 1999) provides a motivational account, based on an individual’s future time
perspective, for how younger and older adults may differentially process emotional
information. For instance, with advancing age, older adults may become acutely aware of
limits to future time left in life. This awareness may cause a shift in motivational focus
toward goals that would be beneficial in the here-in-now, such as feeling good and being
happy. Conversely, younger adults likely have a more expansive time perspective,
facilitating a focus on information gathering goals that can be applied in the future. These
shifts in goal prioritization may be reflected in how individuals preferentially process
emotional information in their environment. For instance, older adults’ motivation toward
present-oriented well-being goals may lead to preferential engagement toward positive,
and/or the avoidance of negative, information (in comparison to younger adults) in the
environment. This preferential positive focus in emotional information processing has
been termed a positivity effect (Carstensen, Mathers, & Mikels, 2006; Reed & Carstensen,
2012).
Evidence for the positivity effect has been observed across several studies and
research paradigms, including assessments of visual attention. Specifically, previous
studies have revealed older adults’ preferential attention toward positive and/or away
from negative stimuli (i.e., facial expressions, images, and words) using a variety of
attentional measures, including dot probe (Mather & Carstensen, 2003) and eye-tracking
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tasks (Isaacowitz, Toner, Goren, & Wilson, 2008; Isaacowitz Wadlinger, Goren, &
Wilson, 2006; Knight, Seymour, Gaunt, Baker, Nesmith, & Mather, 2007). In a recent
meta-analysis, Reed, Chan, and Mikels (2014) observed that positivity effects in visual
attention are more likely to emerge under consciously controlled processing conditions
and when attentional resources are least restricted. Thus, older adults’ positive emotional
preferences likely necessitate top-down processing networks that actively seek out
information that facilitates positive affective goals in the moment.
While supported by a substantial literature, age-related positivity effects are not
ubiquitous across studies; hence, there are likely boundary conditions as to when
positivity effects do and do not emerge. For example, when given sufficient explicit
motivation (Samanez-Larkin et al., 2009) or instructions to attend to specific or nonemotional aspects of a stimulus, positivity effects can be overridden (Reed & Carstensen,
2012). Additionally, Noh and Isaacowitz (2015) found that when distractors impede
control of visual attention, positivity effects are not observed. Finally, another study
assessed older and younger adults’ attention toward both negative and positive targets in
the presence of distractors that were neutral or of the opposite valence of the target (Ziaei,
von Hippel, Henry, & Becker, 2015). Older adult participants were just as capable as
younger adults at resisting attentional capture from positively valenced distractors when
encoding negatively valenced targets. Thus, positivity effects may not be observed in
scenarios where bottom-up assessments of visual attention are examined, or at least
within a time course that commands attention via bottom-up mechanisms. This later point
is evidenced by a previous study that had participants view a series of positive-neutral
and negative-neutral face pairs. Age-related positivity effects did not emerge until 500 ms
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post-stimulus onset and were strongest after 2,000-3,000 ms (Isaacowitz, Allard, Murphy,
& Schlangel, 2009). Knight and colleagues (2007) also observed a lack of valence
preferences in older adults’ visual attention within early fixation measures (i.e., first
fixation deployment) when employing an eye-tracking divided attention paradigm. Thus,
perhaps both positive and negative visual events confer bottom-up salience above and
beyond top-down motivational importance within assessments of early attention.
While substantial research documents advantages with having an age-related
positivity bias, failure to attend to negative information can have undesirable,
maladaptive consequences. However, it may be more appropriate to conceptualize this
trend as a default attentional strategy intended to bolster positive affect. In visual search
tasks, older adults engage with negative information just as efficiently as younger adults
when instructed to do so (Lundqvist, Svärd, & Fischer, 2013). Hence, even if positivity
effects indicate a preference or a default strategy, such preferences do not necessarily
reflect older adults’ inability to attend effectively to negative information.
Threatening visual events represent a special class of negative stimuli due to their
highly arousing nature and need for more immediate attention, and older adults are able
to adequately deploy attention toward arousing negative stimuli (Hahn, Carlson,
Gronlund, & Singer, 2005). Additionally, older adults respond to high arousing images
just as quickly as younger adults (Leclerc & Kensinger, 2008). Thus, along with a
potential top-down, goal driven default preference for the positive, older adults can
rapidly deploy attention toward salient negative inputs (Mather & Carstensen, 2005;
Mather & Knight, 2006, Isaacowitz, Allard, Murphy, & Schlangel, 2009; Hahn et al.,
2006). For instance, Mather and Knight (2006) observed that older adults were able to
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rapidly identify angry faces relative to joyful faces, suggesting maintenance of negative
salience in old age. Ruffman, Ng, and Jenkin (2009) also found that while older adults
may be less adept at providing labels for particular emotional facial expressions (i.e.,
anger), older adults are able to attend and respond quickly to these stimuli. Thus,
although positivity effects represent a motivational shift, when such a preference would
be less pressing or maladaptive, older adults are able to deploy resources toward the
negative.
Change Detection of Emotional Information
Typical change detection paradigms tend to employ non-emotional stimuli/images
within visual arrays; however, the ability to detect changes to emotional objects/scenes
may be more important for determining an individual’s true change detection efficacy
(Michael & Gálvez-García, 2011). Neutral or mundane objects may be less informative,
less motivationally relevant, and require less immediacy in comparison to emotional
stimuli/objects. Michael and Gálvez-García suggest that one strategy individuals use in
visual search tasks is to move from the most to the least salient object when finding a
target. In this manner, observers may naturally gravitate to the most arousing or salient
aspects of a scene before surveying aspects of the array that are least arousing or salient.
Only a few studies have addressed how change detection ability may operate as a
function of emotionality, and these studies have yielded mixed findings. For instance,
Liang and Yu (2012) found that positive stimuli facilitated, and negative stimuli reduced,
change detection performance; however, the facilitation effect for positive stimuli only
occurred during cognitively demanding tasks. Thus, when task difficulty is high,
controlled cognitive resources may be necessary to process positive events (Liang & Yu,
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2012). Typically, attention to salient or arousing visual events occurs automatically
without conscious intent. It seems unusual that change detection would be impaired when
viewing negative stimuli in Liang and Yu’s study because previous literature on threat
detection and bottom-up processing would predict that negative visual events should
attract attention in a stimulus-driven fashion (LoBue, Matthews, Harvey, & Stark, 2014).
It seems this finding could be partially reconciled by the possibility that the negative
images used in Liang and Yu’s experiment did not elicit sufficient arousal to be perceived
as threatening. Additionally, Loranel (2008) indicated that differences in change
detection occur as a function of different emotions, but their results did not form a clear
interpretable pattern.
More work is needed to uncover patterns in how emotion affects change detection
ability for informing current theories. Work on change detection for emotional stimuli is
still quite new, and much research is needed in this area. However, as work on change
detection and emotional processing continues to develop, it is likely that less change
blindness will occur when the change carries emotional weight, compared to changes that
are neutral. One explanation for this prediction is that it is advantageous to notice an
emotional change because such events may require a particular reaction. Conversely, if a
visual change is neutral, successful change detection may be less important.
As exemplified by research on emotion and attentional processes, it would be
incomplete to develop theories on aging and attention without investigating the role of
emotion on various attentional processes, as emotion is relevant to understanding
cognition in old age. Predictions from Socioemotional Selectivity Theory and the
positivity effect would suggest that positive emotional stimuli are more likely to capture
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older adults’ attention through top-down processing due to the importance of emotion
regulation goal priorities in old age (Carstensen, Mikels, & Mather, 2006). Furthermore,
negative stimuli may confer automatic saliency and be detected using bottom-up
resources (Lundqvist, Svärd, & Fischer, 2013). Thus, it is probable that older adults’
change detection performance will be aided by exposure to emotional information, given
that top-down and bottom-up processing could be adequately engaged when older adults
are exposed to positive and negative stimuli.
Older adults’ performance on change detection tasks within situations that are
familiar, self-relevant, or in line with behavioral goals could be superior compared to
performance on standard change detection tasks. Older adults’ processing of emotional
information could be linked to motivational priority when stimuli are positive (top-down)
or confer automatic salience when stimuli are negative (bottom-up). Thus, older adults’
change detection performance may be aided by scenarios that are emotional and/or selfrelevant. Objects that successfully capture attention differ between individuals and across
age groups due to varied goals. Thus, it is likely that change detection ability is relevant
to developmental trajectories of attentional processing.
Some attention theorists posit that change blindness occurs because of our
tendency to ignore the details of our visual field that are irrelevant to our goals, as well as
the absence of active attention toward salient objects in the environment (Triesch,
Ballard, Mayhoe, & Sullivan, 2003). Following Triesch and colleagues’ line of reasoning,
older adults may be more susceptible to change blindness for neutral events because these
details may not be inherently motivating (i.e., positive affective goals) or signal
immediacy (i.e., threat detection). However, older adults may exhibit less change
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blindness for emotional stimuli due to the more robust top-down and bottom-up salience
of such information.
In sum, older adults’ attentional foci are guided by motivationally relevant stimuli
and environments, including finding positive aspects to maintain a positive mood
(Carstensen, Fung, & Charles, 2003) or adaptive reactivity when danger arises (Carretié,
2014). Since many day-to-day scenarios that require rapid change detection consist of an
emotional component, it is sensible to hypothesize that older adults’ change detection
ability may be less encumbered when emotional images or scenarios are employed in
comparison to less evocative situations.
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CHAPTER II
PRESENT STUDY

Results from current work on change detection, paired with theories of emotional
processing in later life, indicate a need for research on how emotional processing operates
within the realm of change detection scenarios. Change detection paradigms have
bottom-up and top-down components, both of which guide emotional information
processing. Few studies have assessed change detection with emotional information, and
this is the first study to assess change detection of emotional information from an adult
lifespan perspective. By adding an emotional component to a change detection task with
a focus on aging, we can assess the following: 1.) whether top-down motivational
relevance will facilitate change detection for positive stimuli for older adults (based on
SST predictions) and/or 2.) whether bottom-up salience of negative emotional
information is more influential in promoting change detection abilities in old age. In this
manner, the inclusion of an emotional component could help us better understand age-
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related trajectories in change detection abilities, inform socioemotional theories on aging,
and inform theories regarding detection as a function of change type (i.e., onset vs.
offset). Thus, by assessing younger and older adults’ change detection performance in
response to emotional and neutral onsets and offsets, we can independently and
conjunctively test these effects.
The aim of the present study is to uncover how younger and older adults may
differentially attend to emotionally valenced visual events within a change detection
paradigm. Given that adequate change detection abilities are essential for survival, and
many instances in which change detection competency is needed in our daily lives
involve emotional situations, it is possible that older adults’ change detection
performance will be aided by an emotional component. Evidence for improved change
detection ability within emotional scenarios could be broadly extended toward
understanding age-related attentional functioning across other domains (i.e., in the
context of driving efficacy, etc.).
The present study will include two experiments. In Experiment 1, participants will
be instructed to detect visual changes (the onset or offset of a positive, negative, or
neutral object) as quickly and as accurately as possible. For each trial, participants will be
presented with a fixation cross for 1,000 ms, followed by two images - each displayed for
1,200 ms in succession, separated by a gray mask screen for 100 ms. One object
(positive, negative, or neutral) will have changed (onset or offset) between the two
images. Using a combination of neutral and emotional objects and different types of
visual events, we can gain a better perspective regarding how top-down (i.e., SST
motivations) and bottom-up (general emotional salience) processing impact change
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detection ability, and what facets ultimately capture attention, within a more naturalistic
environment. Because the detectability of a visual change may be based both on the
valence of the changed object itself and whether it is appearing or disappearing from
participants’ field of view, a second paradigm will be used to separately assess how
emotionality is represented by the type of change and its ascribed emotional value as
compared to the inherent emotionality of the object. Importantly, the design of
Experiment 2 affords the ability to directly assess the influence of top-down goals on
change detection ability. Experiment 1 is structured only to infer motivational
mechanisms through Socioemotional Selectivity Theory based predictions (Carstensen,
Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999), but participants will not receive instructions beyond
maintaining both speed and accuracy. Thus, in Experiment 2, the role of explicit
motivation can be evaluated as a function of both valence and context. This design has
the added benefit of rectifying the ambiguity surrounding top-down factors for offset
trials and bottom-up factors for onset trials (Madden, Whiting, Spaniol, & Bucur, 2005;
Costello, Madden, Shepler, Mitroff, & Leber, 2010), because each type of change has a
different motivational value depending on whether the target represents something
positive or negative. Thus, in Experiment 2, the procedure and presentation times will be
identical as in the first experiment; however, the stimuli will be neutral, and emotionality
will be manipulated by placing affective value onto the objects based on the type of
change event (i.e., onset vs. offset). In this manner, a positive onset and negative offset
are imbued with a “pleasant” affective value while positive offsets and negative onsets
have an “unpleasant” affective value. Thus, emotionality, rather than being inherent to a
particular object, is the product of the initially non-emotional object combined with its
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relation to the observer. Using these paradigms, we should be able to demonstrate how
sustained attentional flexibility across adulthood may function as an adaptive tool during
change detection processing.
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CHAPTER III
EXPERIMENT 1

Method
In Experiment 1, older and younger adult participants were instructed to detect a
changed object (positive, negative, or neutral; onset and offset) within a naturalistic scene
with neutral distractors. Participants were instructed to detect the change as quickly and
as accurately as possible, regardless of target valence or change type. That is, participants
were not given explicit motivational instructions or asked to behave differently as a
function of target valence.
Predictions
Based on the aforementioned literature (Donaldson & Yamamoto, 2012; Yantis
& Jonides, 1984), it is likely that both age groups will detect onsets with faster reaction
times and higher accuracy compared to offsets; however, such an onset advantage may
depend on object valence. Furthermore, it is also expected that older adults will be slower
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than younger adults at detecting changes, but a main effect of age is not the focus of
interest. There are several plausible patterns of results that may emerge in terms of
emotional effects.
Positivity effects. Given the extensive literature on positivity effects, findings
from this study may provide evidence in support of positivity effects derived from
Socioemotional Selectivity Theory. With evidence of positivity effects emerging within
an early time course (starting at 500 ms), we might observe positivity effects in the
present paradigm of 1,200 ms (Isaacowitz, Allard, Murphy, & Schlangel, 2009). While
positivity effects often do not emerge until later on in processing, it is possible that such
effects could emerge in the tasks used in the present study due to the memorial
component of a change detection paradigm. Conversely, younger adults may be more
vigilant to negative objects. As SST predicts that younger adults are likely more
information-oriented, rather than positive-focused like older adults, younger adults often
display a bias for negative relative to positive information (Rozin & Rozyman, 2001).
Overall, an Age x Emotion interaction would likely be reflected in older adults exhibiting
faster reaction times and higher accuracy on positive trials (here, positive trials could
reflect a positive onset and/or a negative offset) compared to neutral or negative trials,
and possibly younger adults exhibiting faster reaction times and higher accuracy to
negative trials (which could be reflected in negative onsets and/or positive offsets)
compared to neutral or positive trials.
Negativity effects. Given the nature of a change detection task, failing to observe
positivity effects would not be particularly surprising because the goal of the task is to
detect the changed object as efficiently as possible. Reed and Carstensen (2012) argue
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that positivity effects are most robust when no additional goal processes are relevant to
the task, and no particular attentional instructions are given. Specifically, these
researchers argue that positivity effects may not emerge if another behavioral goal
overrides the SST-inspired goal of feeling as good as possible. Thus, it is possible that
evidence for a negativity bias for both age groups could be revealed (i.e., reflected in
response to negative onsets and/or positive offsets). The short presentation times and
salience of negative items may support this possibility. Here, we could observe faster
reaction times and higher accuracy for negative trials compared to neutral or positive
trials due to the bottom-up saliency of negative information (Rauschenberger, 2003; Beck
& Kastner, 2005). Additionally, locating a negative object alongside neutral distractors
contributes to particularly efficient visual search, which could aid both younger and older
adults in having faster reaction times and high accuracy on negative trials (Hahn,
Carlson, Gronlund, & Singer, 2005; Mather & Knight, 2006).
General emotional prioritization. Instead of a specific focus on positivity or
negativity, a pattern of results could reflect general emotional salience that does not
discriminate by valence. An emotional enhancement effect would mean a co-activation of
bottom-up processing resources to detect negative salience and top-down processing
resources to motivationally identify the positive (Carstensen & Turk-Charles, 1994). The
time interval in the present study is sufficient for emotional prioritization to be observed
(Isaacowitz, Allard, Murphy, & Schlangel, 2009). In this case, older adults could
demonstrate a general facilitation of emotional change detection compared to their
performance on neutral trials. Although both age groups may perform better on emotional
trials compared to neutral ones, there could be within-group improvement by older adults

35

(Fung & Carstensen, 2003; Samanez-Larkin, Robertson, Mikels, Carstensen, & Gotlib,
2009).
Pilot Study
The purpose of the pilot study was to ensure that ratings of positivity, negativity,
and neutrality of the emotional objects were comparably evaluated by younger and older
adults. Participants were presented with 75 objects (25 positive, 25 negative, 25 neutral)
(see Appendix A for list of objects) and a corresponding ratings sheet. For each object,
participants rated how positive, negative, and neutral the object was on a scale of 1-9
with 1 indicating very negative, five indicating neutral, and 9 indicating very positive.
Five older adults with an average age of 69.8 years from the Cleveland State University
community and greater Cleveland area and five younger adults with an average age of
18.4 years were recruited to participate in the pilot study. Older adults received monetary
compensation at the rate of $5 per half hour, and younger adults received partial course
credit at the rate of .5 credits for each half hour of participation. All participants had
normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
A 2 (Age: younger or older) x 3 (Valence: positive, negative, or neutral) mixed
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on ratings in the pilot study. The main
effect of age was not significant, F (1, 8) = .64, p = .446,  p = .074, indicating that older
2

and younger adults did not differ significantly in their ratings of objects used in the main
experiment. There was a main effect of Valence, F (2, 16), p < .001,  p = .958. A
2

Bonferroni-corrected post hoc analysis on this effect revealed that mean ratings of
positive, negative, and neutral objects all differed significantly from each other. Positive
objects received an overall mean rating of 7.03, (Myounger = 7.15, Molder = 6.90), which
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differed significantly from both negative, t(9) = 14.58, p < .001, d = 6.629 and neutral
objects, t(9) = 9.31, p < .001, d = 2.822. Negative objects had an overall mean rating of
2.40, (Myounger = 2.14, Molder = 2.67), and neutral objects had an overall mean rating of
5.54 (Myounger = 5.42, Molder = 5.74), and negative and neutral differed significantly from
each other as well, t(9) = 14.75, p < .001, d = 5.055. A paired samples t-test was also
conducted on the difference scores of ratings of neutral objects compared to negative
objects and positive objects compared to neutral objects to determine if the magnitude of
intensity ratings differed significantly for positive and negative objects in comparison to
neutral objects. The paired samples t-test indicated that ratings for negative objects
compared to neutral objects (M = 2.75, SD = .56) were significantly more intense than
positive objects were compared to neutral objects (M = 1.97, SD = .73), t(9) = 3.23, p =
.010, d = 1.040. Because positive objects overall were less intense on the positive scale
than negative objects on the negative scale, the five objects with the lowest positive
ratings were excluded from the experiment, as were the five neutral objects with the
highest ratings and the 5 negative objects with the lowest ratings. Neutral objects
excluded from the experiment had an overall mean rating of 6.60 (Myounger = 6.56, Molder =
6.64), positive objects excluded from the experiment had an overall mean rating of 5.96
(Myounger = 5.92, Molder = 6.00), and negative objects excluded from the experiment had an
overall mean rating of 1.68 (Myounger = 1.28, Molder = 2.08). No significant interactions
emerged for the ratings data.
Main Experiment
Participants. Twenty older adults ranging in age from 60 to 87 (M = 68.3, SD =
6.55) from the Cleveland State University community and greater Cleveland area and 20
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younger adults ranging in age from 18 to 30 (M = 20.4, SD = 3.45) were recruited to
participate in this study. In a preliminary study, an a priori power analysis was conducted
based on an effect size of .172 for the interaction of Trial Type and Instructional
Condition (Donaldson & Yamamoto, 2016). By setting an alpha level of .05 and power of
.8 to .95, 16 to 23 participants were needed per group. Thus, recruitment of 20
participants per age group for the present study should have been sufficient (Donaldson
& Yamamoto, 2016).
Participants’ demographic information was also collected. The older adult sample
consisted of seven men and 13 women. For older adults, 30% were African American,
65% were Caucasian, and 5% were Hispanic. For handedness, 85% of older adults
reported right hand dominance, 10% reported left hand dominance, and 5% were
ambidextrous. The average years of formal education for the older adults was 16.05
years, which approximately corresponds to attainment of a Bachelor’s degree. The
younger adult sample also consisted of seven men and 13 women. For younger adults,
15% were African American, 25% were Asian or Middle Eastern, 40% were Caucasian,
15% were Hispanic, and 10% chose not to provide this information. In the younger adult
sample, 100% of participants reported right hand dominance. The average years of formal
education for the younger adults was 13.75 years, which corresponds approximately to
the second year of college.
Participants completed a series of mood and cognitive measures to assess whether
scores on mood and cognitive inventories accounted for age differences on our main
variables of interest. The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS, Watson,
Clark, & Tellegan, 1988) was used to assess positive and negative affect prior to the
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experimental tasks; the Center for Epidemiological Studies Depression (CESD-D;
Radloff, 1977) scale was used to asses symptoms of depression; the trait subscale of the
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs,
1983) was proctored to examine anxiety symptomology; and the SLUMS inventory
(SLUMS; Tariq, Tumosa, Chibnall, Perry, & Morley, 2006) was administered to gauge
basic cognitive functioning. A cognitive battery designed to assess frontal lobe
functioning, consisting of the FAS generative task, mental arithmetic, backward digit
span task, and mental control task was also administered (Glisky, Polster, & Routhieaux,
1995), as well as the Shipley vocabulary test (Zachary, 1986). Cognitive questionnaires
were administered prior to the affective questionnaires in order to prevent potential
activation of cognitive ability from negatively influencing participants’ performance on
the main tasks. Older adults received monetary compensation of $5 per half hour of
participation, and younger adults received .5 research credits per half hour of
participation. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Materials. Experimental stimuli were color digital photographs depicting kitchen
scenes, as this environment is commonly encountered by individuals of all age groups.
Six different kitchen scenes were used an equal number of times to avoid habituation
effects that may occur if the same scene was used for 120 trials. A positive scene, for
example, consisted of the appearance of a dessert tray or the disappearance of rotting
food; a negative scene, for example, consisted of the appearance of rotting food or the
disappearance of a dessert tray; and a neutral scene consisted of the appearance or
disappearance of a kitchen utensil. All non-target items were neutrally valanced. Stimuli
were created using Adobe Photoshop and presented using ePrime 3.0 (Psychology
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Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA). Each scene contained objects typically found in a
kitchen environment, and the set size varied from six to 15 objects to avoid predictability
of whether the trial consisted of an onset or an offset. The objects were arranged such that
half were on the left side of the scene and half were on the right side.
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Figure 1a. This is an example of a stimulus trial for Experiment 1 that contains a
positive target. Here, the plate of eclairs on the right of this image is the target.
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Figure 1b. This is an example of a stimulus trial for Experiment 1 that contains a
negative target. Here, the spider on the right of this image is the target.

Figure 1c. This is an example of a stimulus trial for Experiment 1 that contains a
neutral target. Here, the umbrella on the left of this image is the target.
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Images were presented on a 22-inch computer monitor. The screen was positioned
vertically in front of the participant. The distance between the participant and the screen
was approximately 60 cm. The images were presented so as to occupy the entire screen.
When presented on the screen, the center of the scene was approximately at the center of
the screen so that the left and right halves of the scene corresponded to those of the
screen (see the appendix for the objects used in this Experiment).
Design. Participants began with a short practice session of 16 trials. Stimuli used
in the practice session were unique photographs that were not repeated in subsequent
blocks. These manipulations ensured that participants were not influenced by any
adventitious priming effects resulting from seeing particular objects or configurations in
photographs more frequently (e.g., Chun & Jiang, 1998).
Following the practice session, participants were presented with a block of 120
trials, each depicting a series of photograph pairs. The two photographs of each pair
depicted the same object configuration, but one change occurred between them—a new
object appeared in the second photograph (onset), or one of the objects in the first
photograph disappeared going into the second photograph (offset). One onset trial and
one offset trial were created from the same two photographs by reversing the order of
their presentation. This manipulation ensured that the identical visual characteristics were
present for both onset and offset trials. The onset and offset trials were randomly
intermixed. Each object was used the same number of times to create an onset trial or an
offset trial throughout the experiment (i.e., all objects were presented an equal number of
times throughout the experiment).
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The task was to detect the change between the photographs as accurately and
quickly as possible by indicating with a button press whether the change occurred on the
right half or the left half of the scene. The location of the change was counterbalanced
such that the changed object occurred on the left and right side of the scene an equal
number of times. There were 40 positive trials, 40 negative trials, and 40 neutral trials.
There were 40 trials with a low set size, 40 trials with a medium set size, and 40 trials
with a high set size. The objects and side of the screen on which the change occurred was
also counterbalanced.
Procedure. This experiment used the same procedure as in Donaldson and
Yamamoto (2012), which adopted the one-shot flicker paradigm developed by Cole et al.
(2003). Participants sat in front of a computer screen, centered in front of a keyboard. The
participants were told that they would view a series of photograph pairs in which an
object would change between two images of each pair. Participants were instructed that
the change would be either an onset of a new object or an offset of an existing object.
Participants were instructed to press either the “F” key if the change occurs on the left or
the “J” key if the change occurs on the right side of the screen. Participants used their left
index finger to press the left button and their right index finger to press the right button.
Participants did not have to report whether the trial represented an onset or an offset trial.
Participants were cautioned to be as quick, but as accurate as possible.
During each trial, participants first viewed a fixation cross for 1,000 ms that was
presented at the center of the screen. Participants were instructed to keep fixating on the
cross while it was displayed and maintain their fixation around the same area after the
cross disappeared. Participants then viewed a first image for 1,200 ms. This image was
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followed by a 100-ms gray screen that produced a one-shot flicker of the scene. The
second image was then displayed for 1,200 ms. At the onset of the second image,
participants were allowed to make a button press indicating on which side of the screen
they believe the change occurred if they had noticed it. Following the presentation of the
second image, the second gray screen was displayed and remained on the screen until the
participant made his or her response or until 3,000 ms has passed. Reaction time was
recorded between the appearance of the second image and the participant’s button press.
Accuracy in the left/right judgment was also measured based on participants’ button press
response. When the participant made an error in the left/right judgment, reaction time
from such a trial was not included in the reaction time analysis.
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Figure 2. The trial sequence for Experiment 1. This represents a positive onset
trial, in which the flowerpot (positive target) appears on the right in the second
image. By reversing the order of the presentation, the same image pair could
represent a negative offset trial.
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Data analyses. Data were analyzed via a 2 (Age: younger or older) x 3 (Valence:
positive, negative, or neutral) x 2 (Trial type: onset or offset) mixed ANOVA, in which
age was a between participant factor and valence and trial type were within participant
factors. Although we controlled for set size, set size was not included in the main
analysis, because the function of set size was only to eliminate attentional capture by trial
type predictability, and was not of central interest. Separate analyses were conducted for
reaction time and accuracy.
Results
No participants were excluded from the analyses for having mean accuracy in the
left/right judgment task for either onset or offset trials more than three standard
deviations from the mean of all participants. However, aberrant reaction times were
removed at the trial level for each participant that exceeded three standard deviations
from the mean for that participant. This method of outlier analysis was used in previous
studies (e.g. Donaldson & Yamamoto, 2016) and less than 1-2% of trials in 11 younger
adults, and less than 1-2% of trials in 14 older adults were removed in the present study.
Analyses did not differ substantially with or without outliers.
Covariates. On the Positive Affect Schedule, older adults (M = 39.25, SD = 4.42)
reported significantly higher positive affect compared to younger adults (M = 34.10, SD =
6.91), t(38) = -2.81, p = .008, and on the Negative Affect Schedule, older adults (M =
12.90, SD = 2.77) reported significantly lower negative affect than younger adults (M =
16.35, SD = 5.37), t(38) = 2.55, p = .015 (PANAS, Watson, Clark, & Tellegan, 1988). On
the CESD-D, older adults (M = 5.60, SD = 4.75) reported significantly lower depressive
symptomology than younger adults (M = 14.30, SD = 10.18), t(38) = 3.46, p = .001
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(CESD-D; Radloff, 1977). On the STAI, older adults (M = 29.40, SD = 5.09) reported
significantly lower anxiety compared to younger adults (M = 37.30, SD = 8.43), t(38) =
3.59, p = .001 (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). Older
adults (M = 25.65, SD = 2.96) and younger adults (M = 25.20, SD = 3.25) did not differ
significantly on the SLUMS inventory for basic cognitive functioning, t(38) = -.46, p =
.650 (SLUMS; Tariq, Tumosa, Chibnall, Perry, & Morley, 2006). On the Shipley
vocabulary test, older adults (M = 34.50, SD = 5.15) scored significantly higher than
younger adults (M = 26.95, SD = 3.63), t(38) = -5.36, p < .001. Older adults (M = -.08,
SD = 1.55) did not differ significantly from younger adults (M = -.35, SD = 1.39) on
composite front lobe cognitive functioning scores, t(38) = -.58, p = .565 (Glisky, Polster,
& Routhieaux, 1995). Thus, younger and older adults from this sample had comparable
cognitive capacities, which given the level of education and nature of this experiment, is
in line with what would be expected from this older adult sample. Results of these
analyses indicate what is generally expected in the literature on emotion and cognition in
terms of age profiles on these variables. Importantly, when included as covariates in the
main analyses, STAI, CESD-D, Shipley, PA, and NA scores had no significant effect on
the main dependent variables of interest.
Reaction time data. There was a main effect of Age, such that reaction times for
younger adults were significantly quicker than for older adults, F (1, 38) = 15.59, p <
.001,  p = .291. There was also a significant main effect of Trial type, F (1, 38) = 44.99,
2

p < .001,  p = - .542, wherein reaction times for offsets were significantly quicker than
2

reaction times for onset trials, suggesting greater offset primacy. The sphericity
assumption was not met for Valance, Χ2(2) = 17.17, p < .001, so the Greenhouse-Geisser
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correction was used for this variable. There was a significant main effect of Valence, F
(1.458, 76) = 7.04, p = .005,  p = .156. Bonferroni-corrected post hoc analyses revealed
2

that reaction times for positive trials were significantly quicker than reaction times for
both negative, t(38) = 2.812, p = .023, d = 1.540, and neutral trials, t(38) = 3.032, p =
.013, d = 1.483, and negative and neutral trials did not differ significantly from each
other, t(38) = .888, p = 1.000, d = .321. The main effect of Valence was qualified by a
marginally significant interaction between Valence and Trial type, F(2, 76) = 2.823, p =
.066,  p = .069. A simple effects analysis revealed that for onset trials, positive trials
2

were detected more quickly than either negative, t(38) = 4.88, p < .001, d = 2.520, or
neutral trials, t(38) = 4.46, p < .001, d = 1.653, but negative and neutral trials did not
differ significantly from each other, t(38) = 2.24, p = .093, d = .804. For offset trials,
positive, negative, and neutral trials did not differ significantly from each other. No other
main effects or interactions were significant.
As noted in the Predictions section, a positive trial could either be construed as a
positive onset or a negative offset, while a negative trial could either be construed as a
negative onset or a positive offset. Thus, to provide a more sensitive assessment of
positivity vs. negativity preferences, variables were created to further interrogate the
interplay between participant Valence and Trial type variables. A 2 (Age: young vs. old)
x 3 (Valence/Trial type: positive onset/ negative offset, negative onset/ positive offset,
neutral) Analysis of Variance was conducted separately for reaction time and accuracy
data. For reaction time, there was still a main effect of Age, F (1, 38) = 15.59, p < .001,

 p2 = .291. There was also a main effect of Valence as well, F (2, 76) = 4.10, p = .020,
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 p2 = .097, whereby positive trials, both positive onsets and negative offsets, were
detected more quickly than neutral trials, t(38) = 2.96, p = .016, d = .890. Negative trials
did not differ significantly from positive trials or neutral trials. See Figure 3a for reaction
time data for the main ANOVA and Figure 3b for the follow up analysis.
Accuracy data. There was a main effect of Age, such that younger adults
exhibited significantly higher accuracy than older adults, F (1, 38) = 22.88, p < .001,  p =
2

.376. No other main effects or interactions were significant. Furthermore, there was no
evidence of any speed-accuracy trade-offs. The same follow up analysis used to
understand the interplay between Trial type and Valence variables was conducted for
accuracy as well. Again, a main effect of Age emerged whereby younger adults were
significantly more accurate than older adults, F (1, 38) = 22.88, p < .001,  p = .376, but
2

no other main effects or interactions were significant. See Figure 3c for accuracy data.
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Figure 3a. Reaction time data for Experiment 1. Error bars represent standard errors of
the mean.
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Figure 3b. Reaction time data for Experiment 1 in which positive trials are comprised of
positive onsets and negative offsets and negative trials are comprised of negative onsets
and positive offsets. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
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Figure 3c. Accuracy data for Experiment 1. Error bars represent standard errors of the
mean.
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Experiment 1 Discussion
Results of Experiment 1 highlight two main findings. First, given the extensive
literature on age-related positivity effects, it was possible that findings from this study
could have provided evidence in support of Socioemotional Selectivity Theory given the
time course for the stimulus presentations used (i.e., within 1,200 ms; see Isaacowitz et
al., 2009). While positivity effects often do not emerge until later on in processing, such
effects could have emerged in the tasks used in the present study due to the memorial
component of a change detection paradigm. However, in order for findings from the
present study to support positivity effects as predicted by Socioemotional Selectivity
(Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999), an Age x Valance interaction, in which older
adults exhibited faster reaction times and/or higher accuracy on positive trials (here,
positive trials could reflect a positive onset and/or a negative offset) compared to neutral
or negative trials, or possibly in which younger adults exhibited quicker reaction times
and/or higher accuracy to negative trials (which could be reflected in negative onsets
and/or positive offsets) compared to neutral or positive trials was not observed in the
present study. In fact, we found evidence of greater positive preferences across the entire
sample, as both younger and older adults were much faster at detecting positive targets,
relative to negative and neutral targets.
Older adults may have a cognitively motivated desire to optimize well-being
(Mather & Carstensen, 2003); thus, the enhanced positive preferences observed are
somewhat in line with SST predictions. However, SST would also predict that younger
adults would be less positive focused due to the supposition that younger adults are likely
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more information-oriented and vigilant toward the negative (Rozin & Rozyman, 2001);
this did not appear to be the case based on the present results.
There are two possible explanations for this pattern of results in which positive
preferences emerged for both younger and older adults. One possibility is that we
recruited a particularly happy and emotionally well-adjusted sample of younger adults.
However, the PANAS, STAI, and CES-D data obtained from the present sample would
indicate that both our young adult and older adult sample were representative of what
would be expected for both age groups, with older adults demonstrating higher levels of
PA, and lower levels of NA, depressive symptomology, and anxiety symptomology in
comparison to the younger adult sample (Carstensen et al., 2011).
The second potential explanation, then, is to consider the stimuli that were used in
this experiment, as well as how they were employed. To review, stimuli used in the pilot
study for Experiment 1 were chosen as potential objects that could feasibly exist in a
typical kitchen environment but that had some affective component (aside from the
neutral objects). We did not control for size, contrast, or luminance, as these naturally
vary with objects that occur in naturalistic scenes. Thus, some objects were larger and
more colorful than others. This may have contributed to the noticeability of some objects
over and above other objects. However, the important constraint was the believability of
the object for the purpose of assessing how observers respond to changes in a more
natural change detection paradigm. In that respect, objects were also only placed in parts
of the scene where they could theoretically exist. For example, a water bottle cannot
float, so it was placed on the kitchen counter.
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Interestingly, in the pilot study, positive objects were actually rated as less intense
on the positive scale, compared to negative objects on the negative scale. Despite this
potential limitation, the onset of a positive object was particularly noticeable, as revealed
in the Valence by Trial type interaction. Perceptual features of positive objects may have
been particularly salient when appearing in the scene; positive object color and size
compared to the negative may have enhanced the noticeability of positive objects during
onset trials.
Importantly, in the main ANOVA, an overwhelming offset advantage also
emerged. To fully understand the processing advantage of positive onsets, it is critical to
concomitantly consider the other main finding from Experiment 1 concerning the main
effect of Trial type. Despite considerable research supporting onset primacy (e.g.
Brockmole & Henderson, 2005; Cole, Kentridge, Gellatly, & Heywood; Donaldson &
Yamamoto, 2012), overall, offsets were detected with quicker reaction times in the
present study. Donaldson and Yamamoto (2016) found that despite providing participants
with both implicit and explicit manipulations in order to activate both top-down and
bottom-up processing resources, onset primacy is a rather robust phenomenon, and it was
only with the combination of top-down and bottom-up processing that an onset advantage
disappeared. However, a true offset primacy never emerged. One possible explanation I
propose for the pattern of results obtained in the Donaldson and Yamamoto study was
that the objects were all neutrally valenced and the instructions given were purely
attentional. In contrast, in the present study, the only instruction given was to respond
both as quickly and as accurately as possible, but the objects differed in emotional
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quality. Thus, with neither an explicit nor implicit attentional motivation, an offset
primacy emerged given the emotional nature of this task.
In the supplementary analysis that was conducted in which positive trials were
comprised of positive onsets and negative offsets and negative trials were comprised of
negative onsets and positive offsets, another processing advantage was for “positive”
trials relative to neutral ones. That is, both younger and older adults were paying
particular attention to the onset of a positive object and the offset of a negative object.
Although the overall processing advantage was for offset trials, as indicated by faster
reaction times, the main effect of Trial type also appears to be driven by positivity upon
consideration of the supplementary analysis results.
Importantly, the change detection paradigm used in this study allows for this
disentanglement of emotion not only being inherent to an object but also a product of
what that object represents. Attentional capture by positive onsets and negative offsets
occur as a function of different underlying mechanisms, so it is actually quite interesting
how dominating positivity was in the present study. This point actually speaks to the
preservation of an interaction between bottom-up and top-down processing resources in
later life (Yantis, 2005), given the lack of age interactions. Processing emotional
information involves both exogenous and endogenous attentional control. In typical
change detection paradigms, onset detection is largely a product of exogenous attentional
streams, as attention can quickly be commanded by bottom-up processing resources to
new and potentially salient visual events (Theeuwes, 2004). During emotional object
change detection, exogenous attentional capture is a distinct possibly, especially in cases
of threat. However, when demands for attention are low, people can volitionally engage
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with the environment, and emotions could guide this interaction via exogenous control
(Connor, Egeth, & Yantis, 2004; Rolls, 2008). Detection of a positive onset may be
partially driven by a motivated desire to maintain positive affect and regulate emotions
for older adults (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, & Charles, 1999), so there may be some degree
of top-down processing involved; however, because younger adults showed the same
pattern of results, for onset trials, detection may also largely be dependent on bottom-up
processing resources. In past research, the newness of an onset has a processing
advantage because until it is attended, it is unclear whether or not that event will require
us to react in some important, adaptive way (Cole, Kentridge, & Heywood, 2004). Rapid
detection of positive onsets would be more in line with the pattern of results typically
seen in past change detection studies because the new positive object pops out in the
second image. However, negative offsets operate differently, even though the valence
categorization within these two trial types is equivalent. Detection of negative offsets
commands bottom-up processing because negative objects tend to be salient; thus,
participants’ attentional resources may have made them quickly aware of the presence of
a negative object in the first image (Theeuwes, 2004). Even though in this trial type the
negative object was not the ultimate target (rather the space in the second image where
the negative object was initially located) its temporary presence may have still
commanded observers’ attention in a meaningful way. The challenging part of this task is
the memorial component involved with offset trials, which makes any kind of offset
advantage rather impressive. Yet, in this study, there was a robust offset advantage. One
mechanism typically driving onset primacy observed in the visual attention literature is
the “pop out” effect in which the target differs from non-target distractors on details such
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as size, orientation, or luminance (Nothdurft, 2000). Because of efforts to control for
object “belongingness” within the kitchen scenes, it may be the case that the traditional
bottom-up pop-out effect associated with onsets was dampened in this paradigm. If
onsets were less noticeable than typical, detection of offsets may have been more
noticeable than usual. Regardless, offset detection can still be quite challenging.
Participants must remember the arrangement of the previous display, and correctly
identify the location of the screen where the target was located during the first image. In
this way, this task also requires intact top-down processing resources, which was
demonstrated by both the younger and older adult sample, due to the lack of an observed
Age x Trial type interaction.
Results of this experiment demonstrate that one way to activate (or motivate) our
attentional system is through emotion, even without an explicit motivational instruction.
The lack of predictability from the first image to the second image was a strength in the
sense that this design more closely resembles naturally occurring change detection
scenarios people may encounter. However, this also made for a rather challenging task.
We were able to observe successful maintenance of older adults’ flexible use of bottomup and top-down processing resources to facilitate change detection ability. However,
without seeing meaningful age effects regarding positive preferences, the true effect of
emotion and visual trial type on change detection ability is not resolved following this
initial experiment. Thus, in Experiment 2, we more carefully addressed the role of
emotion on change detection ability by not only considering the combined effects of
Valence and Trial type (i.e., the similar valence of a positive onset and negative), but also
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the effect of a top-down emotional motivational instructions on participants’
performance.
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CHAPTER IV
EXPERIMENT 2

Method
Experiment 1 investigated how the emotionality of objects may differentially
impact older and younger adults’ ability to detect onset and offset changes in scenes.
Results indicated that older and younger adults were both particularly adept at processing
positive-oriented trials. In contrast to assessing change detection of objects imbued with
emotional value, emotionality can also be ascribed to a scene based on what a particular
object represents. For instance, objects (e.g., store merchandise) may not have inherent
emotional value, but when they disappear (e.g., shoplifted from a store), their offset could
be emotionally evocative (i.e., distressing). In Experiment 1, we were able to assess this
implied effect of positivity and negativity crossed between onset and offset; however, in
Experiment 2, we made this interaction between Valence and Trial type explicit to
participants. If all the changes are imbued with top-down affective components, we can
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further interrogate the motivational nature of change detection abilities for younger and
older adults in this type of paradigm.
Thus, considering the emotional context of scenes is critical to understanding how
individuals behave with change detection in their daily lives. The purpose of Experiment
2 was to delineate how an emotional component may motivate behavior, and if the
motivation differs between younger and older adults. Many occasions requiring change
detection in our everyday environment are infused with emotional relevance. The object
that must be detected in those instances may not convey emotionality in isolation, but
within the context, its detection is critical. For example, a trash can, in essence, likely
would not convey emotional meaning on its own. However, if it rolls onto the sidewalk in
front of your child, who is riding a bike, that object now becomes highly emotionally
relevant. Noticing and reacting to that stimulus becomes critical to ensuring the child’s
safety.
Most situations involving change detection represent one of four different
scenarios. If an object with a positive salience (e.g., new puppy) is an onset, this situation
is construed as pleasant. If a positive object (e.g., new puppy) disappears from a scene,
this could be distressing. A negative object entering a scene (e.g., aggressive dog) may
illustrate a threat; and lastly, a negative object disappearing from a scene (e.g., aggressive
dog) could represent relief. Thus, in a change detection paradigm, the same object could
be valued as either positive or negative depending on situational factors; similarly, the
same visual event could carry either positive or negative salience depending on the value
of the object. In the present study, we tested four motivational scenarios to represent each
type of visual event. Determining which of these scenarios has the greatest influence on
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performance in this task should provide us with a better understanding of what affective
events are prioritized within specific affective contexts.
Predictions
Positivity effects. If there is evidence for positivity effects, there may be faster
reaction times and higher accuracy for pleasant and relief conditions compared to
distress, threat, and control conditions for older adults, similar to what was observed for
Experiment 1. Alternatively, younger adults may exhibit faster reaction times and higher
accuracy for distress and threat conditions compared to pleasant, relief, and control
conditions. In Experiment 1, both younger and older adults displayed positive
preferences, as demonstrated by faster reaction times on positive onset and negative
offset trials. Even though younger adults exhibited positive preferences in Experiment 1,
by providing the explicit emotional motivations to participants in Experiment 2 and using
different stimuli, it is still possible that younger adults may have an age-related negativity
bias.
Negativity effects. Given the short presentation times, a negativity bias may
emerge for both younger and older adults. In this case, reaction times will be faster and
accuracy higher for distress and threat conditions, compared to pleasant, relief, and
neutral conditions. Even though Experiment 1 contained negative objects that either
appeared (negative onset) or disappeared (positive offset), the overall context of the
kitchen scene in which these changes occurred might not have fully conveyed a
threatening or relieving environment. By using top-down emotional motivations to
represent the different affective and attentional scenarios, we may be more likely to
observe negativity effects for both age groups in the present study
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General emotional prioritization. If an emotional preference is observed, then
reaction times will be faster and accuracy higher for pleasant, relief, distress, and threat
conditions compared the baseline condition. This emotional preference could be observed
for younger and older adults. Even though a general emotional preference was not
observed in Experiment 1, the different stimuli, and changing emotional context used in
Experiment 2, could alter the processing of these objects in a manner different from what
was noted in Experiment 1.
Pilot Study
The purpose of the pilot study was to choose the most motivating emotional
context scenarios for Experiment 2. Participants were presented with 5 scenarios that
were potentially pleasant (positive onset), 5 that were potentially distressing (positive
offset), 5 that represented potential threat (negative onset), and 5 that represented
potential relief (negative offset). Participants completed the task individually. Participants
were instructed to order the 5 scenarios within each type of change from most motivating
to least motivating. Each scenario naturally had the potential for both onsets and offsets,
but for that situation, it was clear whether onsets or offsets were more crucial to notice.
The scenario that was most commonly motivating for each type of change across age
groups was used in Experiment 2. A stargazing situation in which the goal was to notice a
shooting star entering the sky was chosen for the pleasant scenario (Myoung = 4.4, SDyoung
= .89; Mold = 4.4, SDold = .55). Participants rated a driving situation, in which the goal
was to detect new cars appearing on the road that may endanger safety, as most evocative
for the threat scenario, (Myoung = 5.0, SDyoung = .00; Mold = 4.8, SDold = .45). A description
of maintaining vigilance over children at a daycare center in case one of the children goes

64

missing was chosen for the distress situation (Myoung = 4.2, SDyoung = .84; Mold = 4.4, SDold
= .55). Lastly, an armed intruder scenario was rated as most evocative for the relief
scenario, as the goal was to notice that the intruder had left the scene (Myoung = 5.0,
SDyoung = .00; Mold = 4.6, SDold = .55). A 2 (Age: younger or older) x 4 (Scenario:
pleasant, threat, distress, or relief) analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on
ratings data in which age was a between participants factor and scenario was a within
participants factor. The main effect of age was not significant, F(1, 8) = .27, p = .620,  p

2

= .032, suggesting that these scenarios were rated as equivalently motivating across age
groups. The main effect of scenario was not significant, F(3, 24) = 2.81, p = .061,  p =
2

.260, suggesting that the scenarios were equally motivating. The interaction of age and
scenario was also not significant, F (3, 24) = .54, p = .659,  p = .063. Descriptions of the
2

scenarios used in Experiment 2 can be found in the Appendix.
Main Experiment
Participants. The participant sample for Experiment 2 was identical to that of
Experiment 1. The order of experiments was counterbalanced across participants to
account for potential carryover effects following completion of the mood and cognitive
questionnaires.
Materials. Experimental stimuli were colored, 2-dimensional shapes on a solid
grey background (see Figure 4 for example stimuli). These stimuli were created using
Microsoft PowerPoint, and were presented using ePrime 3.0 (Psychology Software Tools,
Pittsburgh, PA). The set size varied from six dots to 11 shapes. In this manner,
participants were not able to predict whether an onset or offset occurred during the trial
simply by the number of dots present on the screen. Shapes appeared in each color an
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equal number of times, were present on each side of the screen an equal number of times,
and were the target an equal number of times. The shapes were arranged such that half
were on the right side of the screen, and half were on the left side of the screen. Images
were presented on a 22-inch liquid crystal display and occupied the entire screen. The
screen was positioned vertically in front of the participant. The distance between the
participant and the screen was approximately 60 cm.
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Figure 4. This image represents sample stimuli for Experiment 2. This image
contains 10 objects. It is possible that the next image may have either 9 or 11
objects, thereby eliminating the risk of change detection simply by counting the
number of objects present in the array.
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Design. Participants were exposed to all four change detection scenarios (one
scenario per block); however they were randomly assigned to one of four
counterbalanced orders, so that we could assess how different emotional contexts would
motivate behavior for each participant. A Latin Square design was used to develop the
four counterbalanced orders: 1. Pleasant, Threat, Distress, Relief; 2. Threat, Relief,
Pleasant, Distress; 3. Distress, Pleasant, Relief, Threat; 4. Relief, Distress, Threat,
Pleasant. All experimental sessions began with a short practice session of 16 trials (eight
onsets, eight offsets) in which no contextual motivation was given. This was to ensure
that participants were able to notice an onset and offset in this paradigm. Stimuli used in
the practice session were different from stimuli used in the actual experimental
conditions.
Following the practice session, participants completed a baseline control
condition in which their only instruction was to respond as quickly and accurately as
possible to onsets and offsets. The baseline control condition was the same length as the
other four experimental blocks and was used as a comparison against the other four
blocks. Following this condition, participants then went through each of the four
conditions, the order of which was counterbalanced. Each condition began with a
scenario describing how the shapes should be conceptualized for that block of trials.
Participants completed the same 60 trials (30 onsets and 30 offsets) for each of 4 blocks
(and the control block), for a total of 300 trials. The same 60 trials were used in each of
the blocks, but the order was randomized across participants and within each block. Other
studies (i.e., Veiel, Storandt, & Abrams, 2006) have used 100-200 trials per condition,
but given the emotional nature of this task and to avoid participant fatigue, this number of
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trials should have been sufficient. The context determining how they respond to these
blocks, however, was different. In each trial, participants viewed a pair of images
presented in succession, depicting a shape display. One change occurred between them—
a new shape appeared in the second image (onset), or one of the shapes in the first
photograph disappeared in the second image (offset). One onset trial and one offset trial
were created from the same two images by reversing the order of their presentation. This
manipulation ensured that the identical visual characteristics were present during both
onset and offset trials. The onset and offset trials were randomly intermixed. At the onset
of each new block of 60 trials, participants were presented with one of four instructions,
based on the results of the pilot study to orient them to the emotional context of the
environment. These represented the four combinations of negative and positive valence
with onset and offset trials.
The task was to detect the change between the shape displays as accurately and
quickly as possible by indicating whether the change occurred in the right half or the left
half of the scene. The location of the change was counterbalanced such that the changed
object occurred on the left and right side of the scene an equal number of times.
Procedure. Participants sat in front of a computer screen, centered in front of a
keyboard. Participants were then told that they would view a series of image pairs in
which a shape would either be added (onset) to the second image, or deleted (offset) from
the first image. In the neutral control block, participants were not given a motivational
instruction to respond in a particular way. However, in each of the four subsequent
experimental blocks, participants were given a motivational instruction indicating how
onsets and offsets should be conceptualized for those trials. Importantly, both onsets and
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offsets were plausible for each of these stimuli, but one trial type carries more affective
weight than the other type of change in each context. Participants were instructed to press
either the “F” key if the change occurred on the left or the “J” key if the change occurred
on the right side of the screen. Participants used their left index finger to press the left
button and their right index finger to press the right button. They were cautioned to be as
quick, but as accurate as possible. Participants did not have to report whether the change
was an onset or an offset.
For each trial, participants first viewed a fixation cross for 1,000 ms that was
presented at the center of the screen. Participants were instructed to keep fixating on the
cross while it was displayed and maintain their fixation around the same area after the
cross disappeared. Participants then viewed a first image for 1,200 ms. This image was
followed by a 100-ms gray screen that produced a one-shot flicker of the scene. The
second image was then displayed for 1,200 ms. At the onset of the second image,
participants could make a button press indicating on which side of the screen they believe
the change occurred. Following the presentation of the second image, if a response had
not yet been made, a second gray screen was displayed and remained on the screen until
the participant made his or her response or until 3,000 ms had passed. Reaction time was
recorded between the appearance of the second image and the participant’s button press.
Accuracy for the left/right judgment was also measured based on participants’ button
press response. When the participant made an error in the left/right judgment, reaction
time for that trial was not included in the analyses.
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Figure 5. The trial sequence for Experiment 2. This example represents an onset
trial, in which the green oval appears on the right in the second image. By
reversing the order of the presentation, the same image pair could represent an
offset trial. The valence of this image depends on the motivational scenario that is
provided for that block of trials.
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Data analyses. Data were analyzed via a 2 (Age: younger or older) x 2 (Trial
type: onset or offset) x 5 (Scenario: baseline, pleasant, distress, threat, relief) mixed
analysis of variance (ANOVA) in which Age was a between participant factor and Trial
type and Scenario were within participant factors. Set size was used to eliminate the
prediction of trial type based on the number of objects in a scene but was not included in
the omnibus ANOVA. Separate ANOVAs were conducted for reaction time and
accuracy.
Results
No participants were excluded from the analyses using listwise deletion for
having a mean accuracy in the left/right judgment task for either onset or offset trials
more than three standard deviations away from the mean of all participants. Aberrant
reaction times for each participant were removed at the trial level exceeding three
standard deviations away from the mean for each individual participant. This method of
outlier analysis removed less than 1-2% of trials in seven younger adults, and less than 12% of trials in nine older adults (Donaldson & Yamamoto, 2016).
Covariates. Again, analyses of the affective and cognitive measures indicated
what is generally expected in the literature on emotion and cognition in terms of age
profiles on these variables. Importantly, when included as covariates in the main
analyses, STAI, CESD-D, Shipley, PA, and NA had no significant effect on the
dependent variables.
Reaction time data. There was a main effect of Age, such that older adults had
significantly slower reaction times compared to younger adults, F(1, 38) = 52.48, p <
.001,  p = .580. The sphericity assumption was not met for the Scenario effect, Χ2(9) =
2
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22.77, p = .007, nor the Scenario x Trial type interaction, Χ2(9) = 19.79, p = .019; thus,
the Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used for these effects. There was a main effect of
Trial type, F (1, 152) = 39.82, p < .001,  p = .512, in which onsets were detected
2

significantly faster than offsets. There was a main effect of Scenario, F(3.159, 152) =
5.37, p = .001,  p = .124. Follow-up analyses revealed that the threat scenario yielded
2

significantly quicker reaction times compared to the baseline condition, p = .005, but not
compared to pleasant, p = .896, distress, p = .664, or relief, p = 1.000. The interaction of
Scenario and Trial type was significant, F (3.112, 152) = 3.94, p = .009. Simple effects
analyses of the Scenario and Trial type interaction revealed that for offset trials, reaction
time was significantly faster in the threat condition compared to baseline, p = .002 and in
the relief condition compared to baseline, p = .003, but not for pleasant, p = .057, or
distress, p = .075, compared to baseline. Based on simple effects, the motivational
scenarios did not differ amongst each other, p = 1.000. Furthermore, simple effects
analyses of the Scenario and Trial type interaction revealed that onsets were detected
significantly faster than offset trials in the baseline condition, p <.001, pleasant condition,
p = .001, and threat condition, p < .001, but there were no significant differences between
onset and offset trials in the distress, p = .115, and relief condition, p = .450. No other
interactions were significant.
A 2 (Age: younger or older) x 4 (Order: 1, 2, 3, 4) x 5 (Scenario: baseline,
pleasant, distress, threat, relief) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on
reaction time data to determine if order effects were significant, in which age and order
were between participant factors, and scenario was a within participant factors. The main
effect of order was not significant, F(3, 32) = .19, p = .905,  p = .017. The interaction of
2
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age and order was also not significant, F(3, 32) = .14, p = .936,  p = .013, indicating that
2

order did not affect participants differently depending on age. See Figure 6a for a graph
of reaction time results.
Accuracy data. There were no significant differences in accuracy between
younger and older adults, F(1, 38) = .12, p = .737,  p = .003. The main effect of Scenario
2

was not significant, F(4, 152) = 2.09, p = .084,  p = .052. The main effect of trial type
2

was significant, F (1, 38) = 17.12, p < .001,  p = .311, in which participants were
2

significantly more accurate on offset trials compared to onset trials. A 2 (Age: younger or
older) x 4 (Order: 1, 2, 3, 4) x 5 (Scenario: baseline, pleasant, distress, threat, relief)
mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on accuracy data as well to
determine if order effects were significant, in which age and order were between
participant factors and scenario was a within participant factor. The main effect of order
was not significant, F(3, 32) = 2.42, p = .084,  p = .185. The interaction of age and order,
2

however, was significant, F(3, 32) = 3.26, p = .034,  p = .234. Simple effects analyses
2

revealed that for order 2, younger adults were significantly more accurate than were older
adults, t(8) = 2.86, p = .007, d = .425. Because this order effect was found for only one
order, and there were only five participants in each order for each age group, it is likely
that this is a spurious finding. It is improbable that this order effect will have any bearing
on results ultimately derived from this experiment. Overall, there was no evidence of
speed-accuracy tradeoffs. See Figure 6b for a graph of accuracy results.

74

1000

Reaction Time (ms)

900

800

700

600

500

400

Baseline Baseline Pleasant Pleasant Threat Threat Distress Distress Relief Relief
Onsets Offsets Onsets Offsets Onsets Offsets Onsets Offsets Onsets Offsets
Younger Adults

Older Adults

Figure 6a. Reaction time data for Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard errors of
the mean.
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Figure 6b. Accuracy data for Experiment 2. Error bars represent standard errors of the
mean.
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Experiment 2 Discussion
In Experiment 1, the emotionality of the changed object was a product of the
valence of the object itself, as well as the trial type (appearance or disappearance). In
other words, something negative or positive appearing is qualitatively different than when
the same target disappears. For this reason, Experiment 2 was designed to isolate the role
of top-down motivation on change detection of onsets and offsets in four different
emotionally structured scenarios. Experiment 2 used four motivational scenarios to
represent the four trial types in a naturalistic manner, and eliminated within-object
valence possibilities by using non-emotional shape stimuli.
The main finding for Experiment 2 was that reaction times for onset trials
compared to offset trials were quicker for both younger and older adults during the
baseline, pleasant, and threat scenarios. This is sensible for the baseline condition, which
most resembles a standard change detection task employing neutral items; without any
specific emotional motivation, onsets typically confer a processing advantage well known
in the visual attention literature (e.g. Brockmole & Henderson, 2005; Cole, Kentridge,
Gellatly, & Heywood, 2003; Donaldson & Yamamoto, 2012, Jonides & Yantis, 1988). In
the pleasant scenario, participants were instructed to conceptualize shapes appearing on
the array as shooting stars as they viewed the night sky, and in the threat scenario,
participants were instructed to imagine driving and maintaining vigilance of potential
new objects appearing on the road that might jeopardize their safety. Although
participants were not explicitly told to prioritize onset trials rather than offset trials, these
scenarios naturally motivated participants to prioritize onset detection because of the
emotional value of an onset in those situations. The two other scenarios were designed to
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naturally prioritize offset detection in a similar manner. In the distress condition,
participants were instructed to conceptualize objects leaving the array as children in their
care wandering out of sight, and in the relief condition, objects disappearing were to
represent an armed intruder having left one’s workplace. In these scenarios, in which an
offset advantage was expected, although a true offset primacy did not emerge, onset trials
were de-emphasized, as there were no differences in response times to onset and offset
trials. Overall accuracy was higher for offsets across all scenarios. This may be evidence
for a de-emphasized onset prioritization in the distress and relief conditions. Perhaps the
evocative nature of this change detection task enabled participants to be more cognizant
of offset trials, thus enabling higher accuracy therein.
Experiment 2 allowed for the examination of the interaction between valence and
trial type, as well as furthering our understanding as to how explicit top-down
motivational instructions impact how we may view, interact with, and respond to changes
in a visual environment. Changes in this task operated differently than in Experiment 1
because the combination of one particular emotion with one particular trial type were
combined and examined in isolation of the other three potential combinations within each
scenario block. Thus, in Experiment 2, we cannot conceptualize positive and negative
events within the same block of trials in quite the same manner as in Experiment 1. Each
scenario was specifically designed to prioritize only one of these combinations. That is,
for example, participants were instructed to view new shapes entering into the array as
oncoming cars that may pose a threat, but they were not instructed to treat cars
disappearing from the array during offset trials as signaling something relieving. In many
scenarios, such as driving, one trial type is naturally prioritized. Importantly, although it
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is possible, it is not necessarily the case that threat is simply the inverse of relief. Future
work should investigate scenarios in which onsets and offsets are equally motivating
within the same block of trials to examine how these valence effects may operate in a
variety of scenarios.
Other ways in which results of this experiment could be extended would be to
improve the quality of the stimuli and motivations. The stimuli consisted of neutral
objects in a two-dimensional array. A strength of Experiment 1 was to simulate change
detection experience in naturalistic settings. However, use of neutral objects on a plain
background was necessary for Experiment 2 in order to isolate the influence of top-down
motivational manipulations and control for perceptual features of the objects. Given the
simplicity of the images, it may have been difficult for some participants to implement
the motivational instructions as efficiently as possible. Future work may consider using
more naturalistic arrays that still control for as many perceptual features as possible. The
other obstacle participants may have encountered in Experiment 2 may have been the
motivations themselves. Thus, even though these scenarios were most motivating based
on results of the pilot study, there may have been individual difference factors leading to
how well participants were able to implement the particular motivations used in this
study.
Regardless of these potential areas of improvement, results of Experiment 2
demonstrated attentional flexibility. Of course, there are benefits of positivity effects,
such as lower cardiovascular reactivity and better emotion regulation ability (LabouvieVief & Medler, 2002), however there are also benefits to demonstrating enhanced
vigilance toward negative and threatening events because attention to negativity is
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adaptive (e.g., Isaacowitz, Allard, Murphy, & Schlangel, 2009; Mather & Knight, 2006).
Importantly, emotional stimuli can command attention both exogenously and
endogenously. Emotional stimuli are often salient and noticeable (e.g., fast oncoming
cars), and in these instances, it is likely that exogenous features of the environment will
suppress an endogenous motive to react adaptively. However, humans can also be
emotionally motivated internally in a meaningful way by way of endogenous attention, as
demonstrated by how the top-down scenarios used in Experiment 2 altered how
participants viewed the array. By observing evidence of onset primacy in the pleasant and
threat conditions, and a de-emphasis of onset prioritization in the distress and relief
conditions, participants (regardless of age) were able to adjust their attentional
prioritization depending on their current behavioral goals and the demands of the present
environment. This suggests that emotion is a crucial domain in for investigating the
successful interplay of endogenous and exogenous elements of attentional processing.
Additionally, Reed and Carstensen (2012) argue that positivity effects are most
robust when no additional goal processes are relevant to the task, and no particular
attentional instructions are given, yet positive preferences were observed in Experiment
1, in which speed and accuracy were attentional goals. The pattern of results obtained in
Experiment 1 would correspond to a robust processing advantage for relief and pleasant
scenarios in Experiment 2, but that is not what was observed. Reed and Carstensen argue
that positivity effects may not emerge if another behavioral goal (such as the motivational
instructions or instruction to respond both as quickly and as accurately as possible)
overrides the SST-inspired goal of feeling as good as possible, yet at least for Experiment
1, this attentional instruction did not override positive preferences. It is more likely that
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the salience of the top-down manipulations for these evocative scenarios allowed
participants to demonstrate attentional flexibility in unique ways.
One more important finding from Experiment 2 was that there were no age
interactions for accuracy data, so other than older adults being slower than younger
adults, their change detection ability was comparable to that of younger adults. Some
previous work (e.g., Madden, Whiting, Spaniol, & Bucur, 2005; Colcome et al., 2003)
has found that although older adults can maintain top-down control, they are more
susceptible to attentional capture by distractors or difficulty with inhibition compared to
younger adults. In the present study, all of the scenarios were imbued with top-down
motivation. Within each motivational context, older adults were just as accurate as
younger adults. Overall, older adults exhibited slower reaction times. However, slower
speed may be due to distractibility, a different criterion for determinining the target
location, or a motor impairment issue. However, accuracy data at least provide
preliminary support for the preservation of top-down control for older adults in this type
of emotional change detection task.
These data indicate evidence of attentional flexibility across the adult lifespan
when performing emotional change detection tasks. Older adults in this experiment, as
with Experiment 1, exhibited largely preserved change detection ability. Experiment 1
highlights successful interaction of top-down and bottom-up processing resources with an
overwhelming processing advantage for positive trials. In the present experiment, there is
support for attentional flexibility. Even though these patterns of results do not necessarily
fit nicely with SST predictions, they are informative for general attentional processing
theories.
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CHAPTER V
GENERAL DISCUSSION

The present experiments were designed to gain insight into change detection
ability across the adult lifespan by investigating how younger and older adults may
differentially engage with and respond to positive, negative, and neutral visual events as
they enter and exit the visual field. Results of Experiment 1 provided support for positive
preferences for both younger and older adults. The effect of positive preferences was
noted both for positive onset trials and for negative offset trials, suggesting that both topdown and bottom-up processing resources are intact in across age groups. For instance,
detection of positive onset trials may have been guided by the perceptual salience (e.g.,
size or color) of positive objects when they appear in the second photograph, as these
factors may have contributed to their noticeability, through bottom-up processing means.
The other portion of the positivity preference observed in Experiment 1 involved a
processing advantage for detection of negative offsets. This finding may represent
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superior detection of a negative item in the first scene, a process driven by bottom-up
means, followed by maintenance of that item in memory, and a quick response when that
object is recognized to be the target. In this manner, an integration of top-down
processing resources is also necessary in this task. Although Experiment 1 allows for the
disentanglement of Trial type from Valence, the only goal participants were mindful of
while completing this task was to be accurate and quick. The design of Experiment 2
enabled the particular isolation of top-down motives, specifically, by analyzing how
emotional motivation influences attentional performance in different affective scenarios.
Overall, results of Experiment 2 provided support for attentional flexibility, as onset
primacy was noted in the two conditions favoring an onset advantage (pleasant and
threat), and the onset advantage did not emerge in the two conditions that would
prioritize an offset advantage (relief and distress).
On the surface, there appears to be some incongruence with results from the two
experiments. However, in neither experiment was there evidence of any Age x Valence
interaction; thus, younger and older adults were behaving similarly in both experiments.
Overall, reaction time and accuracy data, as well as the lack of speed-accuracy trade-offs,
support the preservation of change detection ability in later life based on these
experiments. One of the main goals of these studies was to investigate the possibility of
attentional flexibility as a product of both internal goals and external features of the
environment as we age. It is clear through these experiments that different aspects of the
environment were prioritized, and individuals from both age groups flexibly adjusted
their attentional systems appropriately. For the positive preferences noted in Experiment
1, participants had to efficiently process two different types of changes equivalently.
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Positive onsets and negative offsets are fundamentally different visual events in that the
target is appearing in one and disappearing in another; offsets entail a memorial
component, whereas onsets do not. Finally, the target differed in emotional quality as a
function of onset and offset. Because these trial types were chosen specifically as visual
events we could plausibly encounter in our daily lives, this finding is critical for
understanding the maintenance of attentional flexibility across the adult life span.
In Experiment 2, the crucial difference, again, was the implementation of a
motivational instruction to understand the influence of motivational endogenous effects
on attention, over and above the top-down effects elicited from the emotional component.
Both age groups were able to maintain attentional control throughout the paradigm, as
demonstrated through high accuracy. The same explanation that could be aiding the
positive preferences noted in Experiment 1 (e.g. perceptual features such as size of
positive objects during onset trials and/or salience and memory for negative objects
during offset trials) are not applicable to Experiment 2, in which two-dimensional neutral
shapes were used as stimuli. One theory potentially useful for understanding the pattern
of results that emerged in Experiment 2 is the Arousal-Biased Competition (ABC) model
(Mather & Sutherland, 2011). According to the ABC model, arousal applies to emotional
information processing in two ways. First, arousal enables prioritization of emotional
information for its saliency. Emotional information is salient both due to bottom-up popout effects in which emotional objects are perceptually different than neutral objects, as
well as through top-down processing because of the meaning or value we ascribe to
emotional objects based on prior experience and situational factors (Mather &
Sutherland). Secondly, arousal enhances prioritization of goal-relevant and high priority
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information. Above and beyond explaining that onsets were both goal relevant and
naturally prioritized in the threat and pleasant conditions, and a compelling feature of
visual attention literature, in these scenarios, according to ABC, onsets are also more
arousing, and therefore more noticeable. Arousal magnifies the chance participants would
efficiently detect onsets in the threat and pleasant conditions given the design of the
emotional change detection task. Due to a lack of visual clutter and the simplicity of the
object arrays, onsets were likely to be amplified in these conditions. While a full offset
bias was not observed in the relief and distress conditions, there was a de-emphasis of
onsets, in that onsets and offsets were detected with equivalent efficiency. Generally,
offsets represent a fundamentally different type of visual event than object onsets. Even
though offsets should have been prioritized and were goal relevant in the relief and
distress conditions, factors including relevance of the scenarios and design of the stimuli,
may have lead them to be less arousing.
It is important to note that the attentional flexibility observed for differences in
trial type between the affective scenarios are particularly impressive because the target
and the distractors were all neutrally valenced. Past research has indicated that locating a
negative object alongside neutral distractors contributes to particularly efficient visual
search, which could aid both younger and older adults in having faster reaction times and
high accuracy during these negative trials (Hahn, Carlson, Gronlund, & Singer, 2005;
Mather & Knight, 2006). In the present experiment, though, the only factor contributing
to the “salience” of the target was participants’ ability to visualize the object as a threat
because, visually, the objects shared similar perceptual properties to the distractors. This
finding lends credence to older adults’ continued ability to maintain top-down control in
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attention-demanding situations (Costello, Madden, Shepler, Mitroff, & Leber, 2010).
They were slower than younger adults, however they still completed the task with high
accuracy. Many instances of change detection that we could encounter in our daily lives
entail affective components, which older adults could be particularly adept at handling
(Mather & Carstensen, 2005). In Experiment 2, older adults’ pattern of results was very
comparable to that of younger adults.
It is worth reiterating that scenarios used in the main experiment were chosen
from the pilot study, and that both younger and older adult raters deemed these scenarios
equally motivating. In addition to the stimuli making it difficult to implement the various
motivational manipulations, it is also possible that the scenarios used were not selfrelevant to be fully motivating. Thus, a limitation of Experiment 2 could be the style of
the pilot study. A future pilot study might instead involve a generative task, wherein, a
sample of participants could be provided with a description of the four types of changes,
and then come up with some scenarios that fit those descriptions that are motivating for
them. The difficulty in generating these scenarios is that one visual event, either onset or
offset, should naturally be prioritized. Using a coding procedure, if the same scenario
emerges multiple times, that may signal a situation that would be worth investigating as a
motivation. In Experiment 2, not all scenarios differed from baseline, and even the threat
scenario did not differ significantly from the other affective scenarios. Future work could
potentially include even more self-relevant scenarios in which individuals devise their
own. Here, once a certain number of options had been generated for each scenario,
participants could choose among those during the actual experiment.
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Moreover, the method of motivation could be altered. For example, as listed in the
appendix, the motivations used in Experiment 2 were presented as written descriptions.
Instead, a photograph of a busy street, or children playing, could have been used
alongside the description to make the task seem less abstract, especially given the nature
of the stimuli.
Additional limitations could be addressed in regards to Experiment 1. Again,
although the images were chosen for the pilot study as objects that could feasibly appear
in a kitchen scene, as well as being large enough for detection in this type of a task, the
images were not perfect. Despite the positive preferences we observed, positive objects
were rated as less intense on the positive scale compared to negative objects on the
negative scale. Having a larger repertoire of objects to rate in the pilot study may have
been one way of handling this critique. Another possibility is to have participants rate
how likely each object was to be present in a kitchen scene, and then somehow control
for this “belongingness” factor. This was partially controlled for in Experiment 1, but
future work should more carefully control for it. For example, a pan and spatula are very
typical for a kitchen, whereas mice and balloons, although feasible, probably arise less
often. Within each valence, ratings for “belongingness” or typicality probably exist on a
continuum. Objects that do not belong may represent a type of newness, which may
attract observers’ attention. This attentional attraction may be life- saving in the case of a
weapon being present, or a surprise if an uncommon positive object (e.g. anniversary
present) is detected. Given that positive preferences were indicated both by the
appearance of positive objects and the disappearance of negative objects in Experiment 1,
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this limitation should not override conclusions drawn from the present study;
nevertheless, implementing these changes could be valuable in future work.
A strength of Experiment 1 was the simulation of a more naturalistic change
detection experience, and the images were designed to uphold this goal. However, this
aim also introduced two important limitations. The first limitation was the potential for a
“belonginess” confound, that could be handled in future studies by having participants
rate the belonginess of each object to the scene used on a continuum and then including
this factor as a covariate. The second limitation of this design is the task difficulty.
Importantly, this task was not intended to be so difficult; however, by examining the
present data and careful consideration of the images used, it is clear that the task used in
Experiment 1 was considerably more challenging relative to Experiment 2.
One theory that could potentially account for the task difficulty of Experiment 1 is
the clutter theory of attention. Clutter theory, applied to visual attention, defines clutter as
visual noise, that can detract from performance, either through reductions in speed or
accuracy, when set size increases with more objects present in a visual array (Wolfe,
1998). Wolfe has conducted considerable research to understand how size should be
determined, and the resulting effects. Researchers tend to agree that clutter impacts
search efficiency. For example, Henderson (2009) demonstrated that clutter correlated
negatively with search efficiency in real world scenes, such that search efficiency was
higher with lower clutter and lower with higher clutter. Specifically, Ho, Scialfa, Caird,
& Graw (2001) found that although younger adults’ performance was better on a visual
search task compared to older adults, and performance for participants of both age groups
declined as clutter increased, older adults’ performance with clutter was not
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disproportionately worse relative to their younger counterparts. Ho et al.’s (2001)
findings are reminiscent of results from Experiment 1. Older adults demonstrated lower
accuracy and slower speed overall, but their performance was still quite high considering
the task difficulty. More recent work on clutter has found that spatial and object working
memory impacts performance more severely when more naturalistic scenes are used
compared to stimuli used in more traditional search tasks (Ren & Sun, 2014). Because
the images used in Experiment 1 were intended to be naturalistic, they likely contained a
more cluttered array than would be encountered in a typical change detection experiment.
The images used in Experiment 1 depicted 6 different kitchen scenes to avoid
habituation to the background environment, which may have reduced the overall valence
of the targets. Even though the set sizes used were approximately equal, there were
additional elements, such as cupboards and counters, which added to scene complexity
(e.g., along with texture gradients and depth that are present in most visual
environments). Thus, it would be advantageous for participants to ignore fixed objects
these scene features. However, if the visual environment is too cluttered, it is possible
that extraneous features capture attention, leading to inefficient change detection, which
then could account for the lower accuracy observed in Experiment 1 compared to
Experiment 2.
This theory may also help explain the emergence of the overarching offset
advantage noted in Experiment 1. In a more cluttered array, it may be easier for observers
to notice the disappearance of a previously viewed object rather than the onset of a new
object. In Experiment 1, many visual characteristics, such as set size, depth, and
complexity were accounted for, but as a byproduct, these considerations may have
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detracted from the valence of the objects in the array. Thus, it may also be important to
experiment with depth of field to maximize the size of objects, relative to other items in
the array. Using photographs of kitchen scenes limited object placement to mainly
countertops and kitchen islands; thus, to make placement of the objects believable within
these scenes, some of the objects were not very large. Future work should consider using
other scenes, such as an outdoor environment, or indoor scenes with more natural
surfaces on which to place objects, with a simpler background. This may enable objects
to appear larger, if they can be placed in the foreground, as well as in the background,
and this manipulation may make them easier to spot in the scene as well as increase the
salience of emotional objects. Future work should seek to create images that are less
complex and cluttered, but are still naturalistic, so that valence effects are more salient.
It is not necessarily a limitation that the stimuli used in Experiment 2 were
intentionally created to be two-dimensional and non-emotional because this design
allowed for the isolation of top down effects of motivation on change detection. Most
instances of change detection are inherently motivating and occur in naturalistic
environments; however, combining the top-down motivational component of Experiment
2 would not allow this effect to be isolated from the investigation of Trial type and
Valence.
Conclusion
Investigating the effect of emotion and types of visual changes are particularly
important across the adult lifespan because adequate change detection ability can be
important for adaptation and survival. A main goal of the experiments was to determine
how studying change detection from an aging perspective is critical both for informing
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theories on aging, theories on emotional processing, and theories regarding the role of
top-down and bottom-up processing on attention. The main aging theory of interest for
the present study was Socioemotional Selectivity Theory (Carstensen, Isaacowitz, &
Charles, 1999). However, observed results did not fully support this theory. Experiment 1
exhibited general positive preferences that were not age specific, and Experiment 2
revealed support for threat effects. However, these findings do support maintenance of an
interaction of top-down and bottom-up processing resources in attention in later life
(Yantis, 2005). Furthermore, results of the present experiments help delineate factors
(e.g., target valence, motivational goals of observer, type of visual event) that impact
attentional capture and how observers respond to emotional information. In Experiment
1, a processing advantage was observed across age groups for positive onsets and
negative offsets, as well as for offset detection overall, and in Experiment 2, with the
addition of a salient top-down motivational component, onset prioritization was noted in
the pleasant and threat conditions favoring onset detection, and onsets were deemphasized in distress and relief conditions that naturally should have prioritized offset
detection. These results contribute to our understanding of cognitive emotional
information processing in aging because older adults can flexibly adapt attention in order
to detect different types of visual events, much like younger adults. Older adults are
adept at processing visual changes with varying emotional salience, similar to younger
adults, and can maintain top-down control when stimuli are sufficiently self-relevant.
Attention is a multi-faceted process and should be thoroughly considered in an aging
framework to understand how attentional faculties, such as change detection, develop
across the lifespan.
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A. PANAS
The words listed below describe different feelings and emotions. Read each item and
then, in the space next to that word, indicate the extent to which you GENERALLY feel
that way; that is, how you feel on average.
1

2

3

4

5

Very slightly or
not at all

A little

Moderately

Quite a bit

Extremely

_____

Interested

_____

Irritable

_____

Distressed

_____

Alert

_____

Excited

_____

Ashamed

_____

Upset

_____

Inspired

_____

Strong

_____

Nervous

_____

Guilty

_____

Determined

_____

Scared

_____

Attentive

_____

Hostile

_____

Jittery

_____

Enthusiastic

_____

Active

_____

Proud

_____

Afraid
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B. CES-D
Below is a list of ways you might have felt or behaved. Please indicate how often you
have felt this way during the past week by circling the number at the end of each
statement corresponding to the four numbered statements listed between the lines below.
During the Past week

0. Rarely or none of the time (less than 1 day)
1. Some or a little of the time (1-2 days)
2. Occasionally or a moderate amount of time (3-4 days)
3. Most or all of the time (5-7 days)

1. I was bothered by things that usually don’t bother me.
2. I did not feel like eating; my appetite was poor.
3. I felt that I could not shake off the blues, even with help
from my family and friends
4. I felt that I was just as good as other people.
5. I had trouble keeping my mind on what I was doing.
6. I felt depressed.
7. I felt that everything I did was an effort.
8. I felt hopeful about the future.
9. I thought my life had been a failure.
10. I felt fearful.
11. My sleep was restless
12. I was happy.
13. I talked less than usual.
14. I felt lonely.
15. People were unfriendly.
16. I enjoyed life.
17. I had crying spells.
18. I felt sad.
19. I felt that people disliked me.
20. I could not get “going.”
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0
0

1
1

2
2

3
3

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

C. STAI
A number of statements which people have used to describe themselves are given below.
Read each statement and then circle the appropriate number to indicate how you
generally feel. There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time on any
one statement, but give the answer that seems to describe how you generally feel.
Generally:

1. Almost Never
2. Sometimes
3. Often
4. Almost always

1. I feel pleasant.
2. I feel nervous and restless.
3. I feel satisfied with myself
4. I wish I could be as happy as others seem to be
5. I feel like a failure
6. I feel rested
7. I am “calm, cool, and collected.”
8. I feel that difficulties are piling up and I cannot
overcome them.
9. I worry too much about something that really doesn’t
matter.
10. I am happy.
11. I have disturbing thoughts.
12. I lack self-confidence.
13. I feel insecure
14. I make decisions easily.
15. I feel inadequate.
16. I am content.
17. Some unimportant thought runs through my mind and
bothers me.
18. I take disappointments so keenly that I can’t put them
out of my mind.
19. I am a steady person.
20. I get in a state of tension or turmoil as I think over my
recent concerns and interests
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1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4
4

1

2

3

4

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2

3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3

4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4

1

2

3

4

1
1
1

2
2
2

3
3
3

4
4
4

D. SLUMS

106

E. Shipley Vocabulary Test
In the test below, the first word in each line is printed in capital letters. Opposite it are
four other words. Circle the one word that means the same thing, or nearly the same
thing, as the first word. If you don’t know, guess. Be sure to circle the one word in each
line that means the same thing as the first word.
1. TALK:
draw
eat
speak
sleep
2. PERMIT:
allow
sew
cut
drive
3. PARDON:
forgive
pound
divide
tell
4. COUCH:
pin
eraser
sofa
glass
5. REMEMBER:
swim
recall
number
defy
6. TUMBLE:
drink
dress
fall
think
7. HIDEOUS:
silvery
tilted
young
dreadful
8. CORDIAL:
swift
muddy
leafy
hearty
9. EVIDENT:
green
obvious
skeptical
afraid
10. IMPOSTOR:
conductor
officer
book
pretender
11. MERIT:
deserve
distrust
fight
separate
12. FASCINATE:
welcome
fix
stir
enchant
13. INDICATE:
defy
excite
signify
bicker
14. IGNORANT:
red
sharp
uninformed precise
15. FORTIFY:
submerge
strengthen
vent
deaden
16. RENOWN:
length
head
fame
loyalty
17. NARRATE:
yield
buy
associate
tell
18. MASSIVE:
bright
large
speedy
low
19. MILITANCY:
laughter
speed
grace
malice
20. SMIRCHED:
stolen
pointed
remade
soiled
21. SQUANDER:
tease
belittle
out
waste
22. CAPTION:
drum
ballast
heading
ape
23. FACILITATE: help
turn
strip
bewilder
24. JOCOSE:
humorous
paltry
fervid
plain
25. APPRISE:
reduce
strew
inform
delight
26. RUE:
eat
lament
dominate
cure
27. DENIZEN:
senator
inhabitant
fish
atom
28. DIVEST:
dispossess
intrude
rally
pledge
29. AMULET:
charm
orphan
dingo
pond
30. INEXORABLE: untidy
involatile
rigid
sparse
31. SERRATED:
dried
notched
armed
blunt
32. LISSOM:
moldy
loose
supple
convex
33. MOLLIFY:
mitigate
direct
pertain
abuse
34. PLAGIARIZE: appropriate intend
revoke
maintain
35. ORIFICE:
brush
hole
building
lute
36. QUERULOUS: maniacal
curious
devout
complaining
37. PARIAH:
outcast
priest
lentil
locker
38. ABET:
waken
ensue
incite
placate
39. TEMERITY:
rashness
timidity
desire
kindness
40. PRISTINE:
vain
sound
first
level
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F. Cognitive Measures: Mental Arithmetic
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Cognitive Measures: Mental Control Task
Time responses to the series of
information below

Response
Time

# of
Errors
2

Accur
acy
Score
 0

Score
(0-5)

Bonus Points
7+’ 5-6’ 4’ 1-3’

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
1



1

0
2




2
0

15 16 17 18 19 20
0

1

2

3

7+’ 5-6’ 4’ 1-3’

ABCDEFGHIJKLMNO
1



1

0
2




2
0

1



1

0
2




2
0

1



1

0
2




2
0

1



1

0



2

2



0

1



1

0
2




2
0

1



1

0
2




2
0

1



1

0



2

PQRSTUVWXYZ
0
4+’
Sun Mon Tue Wed Thur Fri Sat

Jan Feb March April May June

1

2

3

2-3’ 1’

0

2

3

5+’

4’ 1-3’

0

2

July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec
3

11+’ 8-10’ 6-7’ 1-5’

20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Sat Fri Thur Wed Tue Mon Sun

0

1

2

3

6+’

5’

4’ 1-3’

0

1

2

3

17+’ 12-16’ 10-11’ 1-9’

Dec Nov Oct Sept Aug July June
May April March Feb Jan

0

1

2

3

21+’ 16-20’ 13-15’ 1-12’

(0) Sun (6) Mon (12) Tue (18)
Wed (24) Thur (30) Fri (36) Sat

0

1

2

3

INSTRUCTIONS: “I want you to state a series of information to me as quickly as
possible. These series will include numbers, days of week, months of the year, etc. You
will be timed during this task.”
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Cognitive Measures: Generative Naming (FAS)
Word Fluency Measure
Instructions: I am going to say a letter of the alphabet and I would like you to name as
many words as you can think of that begin with that letter. For example, let’s take the
letter B. I could name the words ball, bar, beer, brick, baby. Can you think of some other
words that being with that letter? (have the subject practice the task)
Now I will say another letter and I’m going to time you for one minute. I cannot count
numbers or names of people or places and do not repeat words with different endings like
please, pleasing, pleasingly. Now, name as many words as you can think of that begin
with the following letters:
(Time the subject for one minute. Be sure to record every response and UNDERLINE
ANY ERRORS.)
F

Total # F =
Total # Correct Responses

A

Total #A =
= (F+A+S)
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S

Total #S =

Cognitive Measures: Backwards Digit Span

Item
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Trial 1
Trial 2
Trial 1
Trial 2
Trial 1
Trial 2
Trial 1
Trial 2
Trial 1
Trial 2
Trial 1
Trial 2
Trial 1
Trial 2

Correct Response
2-4
(4-2)
5-7
(7-5)
6-2-9
(9-2-6)
4-1-5
(5-1-4)
3-2-7-9 (9-7-2-3)
4-9-8-6 (6-8-9-4)
1-5-2-8-6 (6-8-2-5-1)
6-1-8-4-3 (3-4-8-1-6)
5-3-9-4-1-8 (8-1-4-9-3-5)
7-2-4-8-5-6 (6-5-8-4-2-7)
8-1-2-9-3-6-5 (5-6-3-9-2-1-8)
4-7-3-9-1-2-8 (8-2-1-9-3-7-4)
9-4-3-7-6-2-5-8 (8-5-2-6-7-3-4-9)
7-2-8-1-9-6-5-3 (3-5-6-9-1-8-2-7)

Score
0 or 1

INSTRUCTIONS: “I am going to say a series of numbers out loud to you. Please repeat
these numbers back to me in REVERSE order. For instance, if I said the numbers 3-6;
you would say _______.”
Note: Discontinue the task once the subject misses both trials within the same item. Each
trial is worth one point. Tabulate the number of points (out of a possible 14) at the end of
the task.
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G. Experiment 1 Stimuli
Positive Objects Negative Objects Neutral Objects
Milkshake
Latte
Strawberry
Wine stopper
Ice cream
Flowerpot
Cookie jar
Award
Cake
Dessert tray
Cappuccino
Gold watch*
Broach*
Money
Cupcake
Pie*
Slinky*
Orchid
Sundae
Wine glass
Trophy*
Rings
Flower bouquet
Balloon
Cinnamon roll

Bomb
Stained mug*
Bloody knife
Spilled coffee
Dagger*
Knife
Gun
Needle
Ash tray
Bee
Mace
Pistol
Poison
Spider
Skull
Dirty dishes*
Apple core*
Dirty plate
Mouse
Cockroach
Rotten banana
Flies on waffle*
Rotten peach
Spilled milk
Shiny insect

Blender
Clipboard
Water bottle*
Pan
Dice
Hole punch
Goggles
Glasses*
Pencil
Napkin
Kettle
Spatula
Waffle press*
Whistle
Towel
Umbrella
Headphones
Coffee pot*
Notebook*
Gravy boat
Muffin pan
Book
Placemat
Coffee in mug
Rolling pin

Note. The items with an asterisk were not used in the main experiment.
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H. Experiment 2 Motivational Scenario Instructions
Pleasant (positive onset)- For this block of trials, imagine you are outside stargazing on a
clear night. As you view the objects in these trials, imagine that each object represents a
star in the night sky. In addition to the typical constellations of stars, you are paying close
attention to new stars that appear in the night sky because these might be shooting stars.
Threat (negative onset)- For this block of trials, imagine you are driving a car. As you
view the objects in these trials, imagine that each object represents another care on the
road. You must pay close attention to new cars that appear on the road to maintain your
own safety.
Distress (positive offset)- For this block of trials, imagine you work at a daycare. As you
view the objects in these trials, imagine that each object represents a child in your care.
After all the children have been dropped off, you supervise the kids while they play at an
outdoor playground. Your goal is to remain vigilant to the location of the children and
pay close attention of an object (child) disappears.
Relief (negative offset)- For this block of trials, imagine you are in a particularly
frightening situation in which an armed individual might be in the building where you
work. The objects represent other people. Your goal is to remain vigilant to objects that
may disappear, as this would signal that the intruder has left and your workplace is safe
once again.
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